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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Why We Need to Study Networks in Economics
For some reasons, social scientists and physicists are not very close academic friends.
This might be due to the fact that physicists analyze the behavior of particles or
matter, while social scientists analyze the action of men. Men is able to make rational
decisions, while matter just behaves accordingly to the laws of nature. In general,
the author’s impression is that human behavior in economics is seen as something
that happens separated from natural sciences, postulated in various models that
sometimes lack explanatory power with respect to real macroeconomic behavior.
Interestingly, economists and especially physicists share one topic in their research:
Both have to consistently explain behavior of systems on very different scales. In
economics these scales are labeled micro and macro. Physicists talk about meso and
macro to differentiate between issues of classical and quantum mechanics. Among
physicists there is agreement that different toolboxes are needed to explain effects
on different scales, and a lot of these toolboxes have in fact been developed. It seems
incomprehensible why economists then care so little about methods from the natural
sciences.
Let me explain some points of this slightly exaggerated critic: Modern mathe-
matical methods have been introduced into economics decades ago and they have
taken us a long way in understanding dynamical systems, market clearing conditions,
and optimal planning and control. The concept of the utility maximizing household
is working fine as a cornerstone in microeconomic models, even if no real household
will ever solve any equation system. However, the last financial crisis has revealed
that despite their technical complexity our recent macroeconomic models too often
lack practical usability aside from narrowly defined research questions.1
In these models society is mostly represented by a representative consumer or pro-
ducer, whose decision is implicitly duplicated for the rest of the society. Economists
accept that methods which are good for predicting the economy on the household
level are not always very helpful to describe aggregate behavior and vice versa.
1 See, e.g., Krugman (2009), “What went wrong with economics”.
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Nevertheless, macroeconomics is very much based on the methodology of microeco-
nomics, which sometimes works fine, but at some point, especially when it comes to
explaining crisis and interactions, totally breaks down. In the wording of physics,
the required information for the prediction of aggregate behavior is not only the
knowledge about isolated particles, but also the knowledge about the distribution
of relevant attributes of these particles, and their interactions. This means that
even if the behavior of a single particles can be predicted, it is known that on the
aggregate level other forces come into play and that not even the aggregation over
all predictable particles does necessarily say anything about the behavior of the
aggregate.
Moreover, many systems that we analyze in economics are so complex that we
cannot assume that single participants or macroscopic groups have full knowledge
of the consequences of their decisions and actions. While it seems reasonable that
decisions involving a limited number of counterparts and a manageable set of in-
formation will be taken rationally, this becomes doubtful for models which assume
rational expectations about large sets of macroeconomic variables. If we accept that
the so-called micro-foundation of our macroeconomic models is problematic, because
it will not necessarily lead to a sufficient explanation of aggregate behavior, we might
sometimes be better off to treat the people in our models like ‘particles’, which can
do nothing else than behave according to the laws of nature.
Network science, and especially the physics community, has developed power-
ful tools to work on some of the above mentioned problems. They allow us to
build upon an agent or household based description of behavior. They allow us
to describe heterogeneity in society and they are intended to analyze connections,
interdependencies, and interactions – all ingredients which are likely to improve our
understanding of economics.
Even though it is evident that the economic and social systems that we want
to analyze all inhibit a network structure, it is not very common in economics to
describe and model problems in terms of networks. In this thesis, I will present four
topics where networks are explicitly used to do this. The second chapter deals with
a theoretical model about opinion formation, as it can be used to describe investors
in financial markets. Chapter 3 is pure empirical work. We analyze the network
of board members of German companies. In the forth chapter, the view is back
on a classical finance topic. The network here is not given directly, it is a latent
one, given by the similarity graph derived from an analysis of correlations of stock
returns. The last chapter finally relates directly to the financial crisis of 2008 and
financial contagion. We investigate the Italian interbank loan market and analyze
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how it has changed since the crisis.
In the following we will discuss basic principles of network science. A more
detailed summary of the chapters can be found in Section 1.5.
1.2 Heritage and Development of Network Science
Network science has always been an interdisciplinary field. It is almost forgotten that
around 70 years ago many foundations of what we today call social network analysis
have been developed by sociologists and social psychologists, see e.g. Moreno and
Jennings (1938). They used graph theory and basic concepts of statistics to study
human relationship and thus introduced these methods into the field of sociology.
Studies based on questionnaires gave an idea about the average number of social
contacts of people. Moreno called his approach Sociometry. He used systematically
collected data from schools and work groups and analyzed the connections and
attitudes between the people in the samples. This modeling lay the foundations of
social network analysis, (see, e.g., Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Freeman, 2004).
It was then White et al. (1976) whose description of people, acting dependent on
their position and role in their network, gave another important impulse for mod-
ern sociology and for the use of quantitative methods. White studied mathematics,
made a PhD in physics and a bit later turned to sociology. He introduced mod-
ern structural analysis into social network analysis, and is very well known for the
concept of structural equivalence. Lorrain and White (1971) showed, how nodes can
be compared to each other, which enables us to detect relationship patterns in net-
works. White inspired a huge number of scientists, many of them his students, to
carry on his research. It became evident from their research that the position which
people have in their social network is crucial for their development in life, and that
for this reason more research had to be done on network structure.
Especially since the 1990s much of this kind of research has been carried on by
physicists. Computer scientists have become active in the field as well, motivated
by datasets of growing online-communities in the world wide web.
It is obvious that there is some gap between the introduction of network science
into sociology and the more recent approaches. The reason for this was the lack
of reliable larger datasets and the possibility to analyze them (see Rosvall, 2006).
As a result, for quite some time it was not evident to most researchers, how larger
real world social networks look like. In a seminal paper Travers and Milgram (1969)
found out that the average separation of two people in our society is about six,
which means that through friends, and friends of friends, you can reach another
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person mostly after six ‘steps’. At that time this was an overwhelming finding
and gave an idea at least on average distances and connectivity in social networks.
After that a lot of theoretical work was done on so-called random networks of the
Erdo¨s and Renyi (1959) type, in which links are evenly distributed between nodes
with respect to number and destination. Despite some evidence that these kind of
networks do not resemble reality, it took up to the late 1990s to realize that networks
in real life mostly have a scale-free degree distribution following a power-law. Albert
et al. (1999) show this fact by analyzing connections of web-sites in the world wide
web. The finding that nodes differ dramatically in the number of connections they
have, gave a new impulse to the field, since this stylized fact could explain patterns
of information and disease spreading.
In some disciplines network theory has been used for a long time, for example
in medicine for a description of the immune system, like in Hoffman (1975). After
the stylized facts of social networks are to some extend known, the usage has grown
even more. In biology and medicine the spread of disease is modeled with concepts
from network science. Liljeros et al. (2001) show that policies on HIV prevention
can be derived, Eubank et al. (2003) model the spread of disease in urban networks.
Biologists an ecologists analyze food webs (e.g. Dunne et al., 2002) and other parts
of the ecosystem with network science methods.
1.3 Basic Concepts in Network Science
1.3.1 Graphs, Nodes, and Edges
The terminology in network science is sometimes rather lose. A network is a graph,
which consists of vertices and edges connecting them. In the language of the mathe-
matician, this graph will only be a network, if the edges have weights (or distances)
assigned to them. In this case, vertices are also called nodes and edges become links.
However, in the literature this condition is mostly dropped and the above mentioned
terms are used synonymously (see, e.g., Jackson, 2008; Rosvall, 2006).
Nodes mostly represent objects or people and edges represent relationships be-
tween them. Links can be unidirectional or bidirectional. In the latter case we
explicitly differentiate the direction of a connection while in the case of unidirec-
tionality this is not possible. The intensity of a relationship can be expressed by
assigning a weight to each link. The resulting network is then also called a weighted
network.
In order to work with network data, these are mostly mapped to a matrix. The
most common method is to use an adjacency matrix. An example is shown in Figure
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
1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1

Fig. 1.1: Network and adjacency matrix
The small network on the left can be described by the adjacency matrix to the right. Node
1 is connected to the nodes 4,5 and 3. These connections are represented by the 1 entries
in the first row of the matrix. Here the entries on the trace are 1 by definition.
1.1. Given a network with N nodes we define a matrix A[N×N ] such that each entry
in row i column j is 1 if the nodes i and j are connected. For weighted networks the
values aij can take any value. A is symmetric if the network is unidirectional.
1.3.2 Degree
The term degree describes the number of links that a node has. More interesting
than the degree of a single node is of course the degree distribution of a network.
In a random network, for example, the probability of each node to be connected to
any other node is the same for all nodes in the network. As a result, the degree
distribution is Binomial. As mentioned above, we mostly find scale-free networks in
the real world. This term refers to the stylized fact that the degree distribution of
most networks follow, at least in approximation, a power law, such that the number
of links l follows P (l) ∝ l−γ. These networks have many nodes with a low degree and
only few with a high degree. This has implications for the length of the shortest path
when tracing from each node to any other node. It explains, for example, Milgram’s
finding of humans only being six degrees of separation apart. This feature is driven
by the existence of high degree nodes, so-called hubs, which, similarly to big airports,
link to all parts of the network.
1.3.3 The Special Case of Bipartite Graphs
A special type of network can be derived from a bipartite graph. Such a graph
consists of two sets of vertices, edges show the relations between edges from the
different sets. A graph can be called bipartite, if we can group the vertices into two
sets, such that no edges exist within the groups and each vertex has at least one
edge. These kind of graphs mostly show some kind of membership or incidence of
vertices for the two sets.
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Fig. 1.2: Bipartite graph
The network on the left is a bipartite graph, it consists of two sets, the set of students and
the set of their supervisors. From this graph we can come up with two projections, the
network of supervisors and the network of students. Students are connected if they share
at least one supervisor. Supervisors are connected if they share at least one student. Since
Lux is a supervisor to all students, the network of students is complete while the network
of supervisors is not.
The incidences that a bipartite graph shows can be projected into two directions,
into the network of nodes from the first set (being connected by sharing a vertex
from the second set) and vice versa the network of the second set. An example of
a bipartite graph is given in Figure 1.2. This graph consists of the set of supervi-
sors and the set of students that they supervised. Since every student is normally
supervised by two supervisors, the projection of the graph on the students network
shows a dense network between the students. The other projection from this graph
is the network of supervisors.
Instead of using an adjacency matrix, this graph can be described by an incidence
matrix. In this case the bipartite graph is mapped to a matrix IN×L where iij = 1
if vertex i is adjacent to edge j.
When we define the students as vertices and the supervisors (or professors) as
edges which point to them, we can use the incidence matrix I[S×P ] and derive the
adjacency matrix of the network of students as S = IIT and the adjacency matrix
for the network of professors from P = IT I.
Bipartite graphs will show up again in Chapter 3 when we turn to analyze exec-
utives and their membership in different company boards.
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1.3.4 Assortativity and Clustering
Whether a node in a network is rather important or not is one of the general questions
in network science. Being important is mostly associated with having a lot of links,
but also where links lead can be decisive.
The first concept to describe how nodes are linked is based on very basic measure
of degree. Networks in which nodes with a high degree are mostly connected to other
nodes of high degree are called assortative, while the converse is called disassortative.
Assortativity can also refer to other properties of nodes then just degree, assorta-
tive mixing describes the correlation between all attributes of connected nodes (see
Newman, 2002).
Social networks mostly show a high degree of clustering, in this case the prob-
ability that two nodes which are linked to the same other node are also connected
among each other is very high. Interestingly, this redundancy of connections has
been found to make links which lead outside of such a clustered group rather valu-
able. This is called the concept of the strength of weak ties named by Granovetter
(1973). According to his work, society consists of strongly wired communities, linked
by weak ties, which hold the community together.
While the concept of clustering describes properties of the entire network, there
are some measures to describe single nodes, the best known might be centrality. To
calculate the betweenness centrality of a node, we have to count how many shortest
paths between any two other nodes run through the node for which we calculate the
betweenness centrality. This gives an idea of how critical this node is for the overall
network (see Newman, 2010).
1.3.5 Community Structures
Following the idea of Granovetter about the existence of strongly connected compo-
nents within networks, numerous methods have been developed to identify clusters.
The goal of graph partitioning or community detection is to split the nodes of a
network into groups, such that many links exist inside the groups and only few links
remain in between nodes of different groups.
There are two streams of literature on this topic, the first (and older one) on graph
partitioning tries to split the network into a fixed number of subgraphs. The method
of spectral partitioning for example achieves this by evaluating the eigenvalues of
the Graph Laplacian2. In larger datasets it is mostly inconvenient to work with a
predefined number of clusters. Moreover, some matrix calculations become very time
2 The Laplacian is a special form of the adjacency matrix of the network, where the trace of the
Laplacian correspond to the number of links between nodes, see Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
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consuming. Community detection therefore has developed algorithmic procedures,
which endogenously detect the number of subgraphs in the partitioning process (see,
e.g., Newman, 2010; von Luxburg, 2007).
The method by Newman and Girvan (2004) is based on betweenness centrality.
In a given network, their algorithm removes the links with the lowest betweenness
score until the graph falls apart into two pieces. The procedure can be repeated
with the remaining subgraphs up to the desired level of partitioning. This algorithm
works fine with networks of all sizes.
The algorithm by Rosvall and Bergstrom (2008) is an approach based on infor-
mation theory. It detects communities by optimizing the path that an imaginary
‘random walker’ would take through the network. The problem of clustering is then
equivalent to finding an efficient description of his path.
A known problem of graph partitioning is that communities often overlap. Palla
et al. (2005) try to deal with this problem with their ‘clique percolation’ approach,
which allows to detect overlapping communities in networks.
1.3.6 Correlation-Based Networks
Networks can be used to describe all kind of systems, what is needed is a definition
of the edges and the vertices. Empirical networks can sometimes be observed, but
often they have to be derived from latent variables. Edges can be described as
connected if they show some kind of proximity in time or space. Networks can
also be derived from patterns of communication, reference, or pure coexistence (see
da Rocha, 2011). Networks that are based on correlation, for example of time-series,
are only recently gaining more attention (see Tumminello et al., 2007; Lacasa et al.,
2008).
Figure 1.3 shows how proximity (or similarity) can be inferred from financial
market time series. The plot is based on the returns time series of the largest
German publicly listed firms on a daily basis for the years 2008–2009. We can
calculate the matrix of correlation coefficients for all time series and assign a color
coding to the correlation coefficients. The matrix has been sorted such that firms
with similar correlations coefficients are closely together and that overall correlation
is decreasing top to bottom. We observe that the correlations differs significantly
and that at least two groups seem to exist which are more correlated which each
other than with the rest of the market. The correlation coefficients can then also be
interpreted as weights or distances of the firms in a network. For more details see
Section A in the Appendix and the work in Chapter 4.
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Fig. 1.3: Correlation of stock returns
The matrix is ordered according to the outcome of a dendrogram clustering algorithm. The
strength of the correlation is given by a color code from 0 (dark blue) to 1 (red).
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Fig. 1.4: Temporal network
The top panel shows the engagement of banks in the overnight loan market in a stylized
example. A bilateral contract is represented by an arc between the dotted lines. The bottom
panels show the resulting networks that emerge trough interactions between banks in a
time window illustrated by the gray boxes. The example shows that the resulting network
critically depends on the position and length of the time window.
1.3.7 Temporal Networks
A still relatively new topic in network science are temporal networks (also called
dynamic networks). Holme and Saramaki (2012) stress that one has to account for
the fact that links are not necessarily active continuously. A simple example from
an economic setting in shown in Figure 1.4. The nodes in this network are banks
which trade loans between each other. While the banks will exist for a rather long
time, the links between each other change on a high frequency. The network that
we can infer from these loan contracts will depend on the time window.
In choosing an appropriate time window we are faced with trade-offs. While
general features of the network structure only become visible when we observe it over
a long time window, dynamics of the networks might become difficult to identify. On
short time scales networks typically show a high degree of randomness in connections,
but the dynamics of the micro-structure become observable. We will extend on this
topic in Section 5.
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1.4 Fault Lines
The interest in networks in economics has increased noticeably with the financial
turmoil of 2008. Suddenly, it was evident to most economists that much of the
mechanism that transfered the financial crisis from the U.S. housing market into
almost every other country can be described as a network effect. Even more, the
relationships between banks and other financial institutions, their ability of domino-
like collapse fostered by bilateral exposures, resembles a network. The concept of
financial contagion has been on the agenda for some time but has not gained much
popularity besides the article by Allen and Gale (2001), who discuss the effect in
a small-scale model. Empirical studies on the stability of the banking system have
been performed for the Italian market by Iori et al. (2008) and for the U.S. by
Sorama¨ki et al. (2007). These studies gained some interest from regulators and
central banks, however, it has to be noted that most of this work stems from the
interdisciplinary physics community.
Most contributions to network science from economists have their roots in game
theory. In this context, it is discussed, why two individuals should initiate a link
between each other (see Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) and which network configura-
tions are stable, given that there is some benefit from a connection and some cost
of upkeep in a game of link formation. According to Bala and Goyal (2000), ‘stable’
structures resulting from such games are circles or fully connected networks.
Even if some results from this kind of research are very interesting, it is easily
noticed that most of their methods have never spilled over to researchers in other
disciplines. The reason for this seems to be that in the mean time, many stylized facts
of social and economic networks have been pinned down. The networks, however,
that are the result of the before mentioned ‘microapproaches’ do not resemble these
stylized facts. They mostly do not have a power law degree distribution, they do
not show clustering, and above all, they are mostly very small.
I hope that the research presented in the following chapters is a small step of
bringing economic research on networks closer to the interdisciplinary community
which has established over the last 15 years.
1.5 The Chapters in Brief
Networks and Herding
Herding models have been developed to explain the joint behavior of interacting
individuals. The model presented here is based on the model of Kirman (1993). It
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describes the switching of a population of individuals between two groups. While the
original model uses an aggregate description of the system, where all of its individuals
are identical, Chapter 2 provides a setting where individuals are given different
weights, and where the network structure between actors is varied. The results
obtained from the simulations hint at problems associated with the concentration of
investment decisions. The main contribution of this work is to show that hierarchical
networks not only warrant non-Gaussian properties for any system size, but also
lead to an increase in system-wide volatility. Viewed from this perspective, the mere
existence of institutional structures like managed funds, which essentially correspond
to hierarchical networks, would represent a source of financial volatility.
Board Networks
Chapter 3 deals with the evolution of the network of German companies. Board
director who serve on more than one board connect the respective firms for which
they work. Directors on the other side are connected by working for the same
company. We examine the bipartite graphs of the German corporate boards in
1993, 1999 and 2005, and identify cores of directors who are highly central in the
entire network while being densely connected among themselves.
Although mergers and acquisitions have reshaped large part of these companies,
and although corporate governance policy on multiple mandates has changed, the
statistical patterns of this network have been maintained. The dynamic analysis of
links and the selection of new board members suggests that the recruitment decisions
of new managers follows a strategy that explains the prevalence of a stable cluster
in the network of firms.
The Network of International Stock Markets
In this chapter we start out by examining the dynamics of the correlation structure in
six different stock markets. These markets are the U.S., the U.K., Japan, Germany,
China and India. We find that the correlations within most of these markets have
increased over time. Moreover we find that bursts of strong correlation seem to
happen jointly in different markets. We try to quantify these meta-correlations over
the period from 2000–2010. The results suggest that these meta-correlations are
helpful to identify spill-overs of market stress better than a pure analysis of stock
index comovements. Further our findings indicate that the growing volatility in
financial markets is not necessarily a result of mutual foreign influence, but that
also the separate markets have become more correlated internally.
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The Network of Italian Banks
In the last chapter we analyze the Italian interbank loan market during the time
of 1999–2010. The analysis of net trade flows shows a high imbalance caused by a
few large net borrowers in the market. The trading volume shows a significant drop
starting in 2007 and accelerates with the Lehman default in late 2008. The network,
based on trading relationships, is very dense, hence we try to identify strong links
by looking for preferential lending relationships expressed by discounts in the loan
rate. Furthermore, we estimate the dynamics of credit spreads for each bank and
find that economically significant spreads for the overnight market only developed
in 2010. The analysis of bilateral loan relationships reveals that in the pre-crisis era
large net borrowers used to borrowed at a slight discount. In the post-Lehman era
borrowers with large net exposures paid more than the average market rate, which
shows that the risk evaluation of market participants has changed considerably
1.6 Note on Joint Work
Parts of the material presented here are the result of joint work with other re-
searchers. The network model in Chapter 2 was a joint work with Simone Alfarano
and Mishael Milakovic´. The analysis of the board network in Chapter 3 was joined
work with Laura Birg, who contributed the dataset, and Mishael Milakovic´, with
whom I developed the paper. The analysis of stock returns in the Chapter 4 is joined
work with Dror Y. Kenett, the resulting paper was co-authored by Eshel Ben-Jacob
and Thomas Lux.
2. INSTITUTIONAL HIERARCHY AND VOLATILITY IN
FINANCIAL MARKETS
This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in the European
Journal of Finance c©2012 (copyright Taylor & Francis); the European Journal of Finance is
available online at www.tandfonline.com
2.1 Introduction to Herding Models
Financial time series exhibit ubiquitous non-Gaussian statistical regularities across
different countries, assets, and time frequencies. The two most prominent features
concern the fluctuations in the prices of financial assets, which exhibit heavy tails
and clustered volatility (see, e.g., Cont, 2001; Pagan, 1996). From a statistical point
of view, the prevalence of non-Gaussian distributions in returns and their volatilities
testifies to the importance of long-range correlations, which ultimately prevent the
application of the Central Limit Theorem (CLT). Traditional finance has paid little,
if any, attention to the origins of these statistical regularities and to the possibly most
challenging question implied by the violation of the CLT: how does a complex system
like the financial market actually allow for a large scale coordination of the trading
positions among millions of agents? The established literature on informational
cascades (see, e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Chamley, 2004) does
not address this question because it considers a static, sequential Bayesian updating
approach with a constant ‘true’ state of the world and lacks any connection to the
stylized facts of financial returns. The three major strands of the agent-based finance
literature, on the other hand, argue in unison that it is precisely the perpetually
alternating coordination of trading strategies over time that is responsible for the
stylized facts of financial returns. Yet each of the approaches has to deal with its
own set of problems.
Percolation models of herd behavior exploit the properties of well known crit-
ical systems from the statistical physics literature (see, e.g., Cont and Bouchaud,
2000; Iori, 2002; Bornholdt, 2001; Stauffer and Sornette, 1999) but rely on carefully
adjusted model parameters near criticality to produce non-Gaussian statistics, en-
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tirely leaving open how or why a financial market composed of millions of agents
could self-organize into (and remain in) such a critical state. The second strand of
models follows the seminal work of Brock and Hommes (1997) where agents interact
globally rather than locally, namely through the price system and public information
about the performance of strategies that is subject to noise (see, e.g., Hommes, 2006;
Chang, 2007). The drawback of this class of models is that they need a careful fine-
tuning of their ‘signal-to-noise ratio’ around unity in order to resemble the stylized
facts. Finally the third strand, and starting point of the present paper, is inspired by
entomological experiments concerning ants’ foraging behavior that Kirman (1991,9)
utilized to propose a stochastic herding model of opinion formation among financial
investors. These models endogenously create swings and herding behavior in aggre-
gate expectations through social agent interaction, while the stationary distribution
of the stochastic process of opinion formation describes the statistical equilibrium of
the model.
The ‘ant model’ has been reasonably successful in replicating the statistical
features of financial returns, but Alfarano et al. (2008) have shown analytically
that Kirman’s original model suffers from the problem of self-averaging or N-
dependence:1 the model’s ability to replicate the stylized facts vanishes for a given
parametrization when the system size N increases, a quite common feature in agent-
based models that has received relatively minor attention so far (see, e.g., Aoki, 2008;
Egenter et al., 1999; Lux and Schornstein, 2005). Alfarano and Milakovic´ (2009) es-
tablish a direct link between N -(in)dependence and the communication network
among agents in a generalized version of Kirman’s original model. They show that
the model is immune to self-averaging if the relative communication range of agents
remains unchanged under an enlargement of system size. Interestingly and rather
counter-intuitively, other network features like the functional form of the degree dis-
tribution, the average clustering coefficient, the graph diameter, or the extent of as-
sortative mixing have no impact on the N -dependence property. Put differently, the
average number of neighbors per agent has to increase linearly with the total number
of agents N in order to overcome the problem of self-averaging in the generic herding
model. Among prototypical network structures such as regular lattices, small-world,
or scale-free networks (see, e.g., Newman, 2003), it is only the random graph with
constant linking probability that exhibits this feature, yet random graphs are hardly
ever a realistic representation of socio-economic communication networks.
After all, the results of Alfarano et al. (2008) and Alfarano and Milakovic´ (2009)
1 Aoki utilizes the terms (non) self-averaging in lieu of N -(in)dependence, and we will subse-
quently use both terms interchangeably.
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establish the model’s behavior when the number of agents tends to infinity, at the
same time illustrating that simple proto-typical network structures (with the ex-
ception of the empirically unsatisfactory random graph) cannot overcome the prob-
lem of N -dependence. The present paper builds on these insights and investigates
whether a certain class of core-periphery networks might be capable of overcoming
the self-averaging property of the original model. Here we consider a central network
with bi-directional links between core agents or opinion leaders on one hand, and
a relatively large number of uni-directionally linked followers in the periphery on
the other. We vary the number of followers per core agent by randomly drawing
from various distributions, and study the aggregate behavior of system-wide opin-
ion dynamics under an increasing dispersion in the number of followers. In essence
the hierarchical network corresponds to a weighted version of the original model.
As we argue below, the weighted version is a reasonable first approximation of the
institutional structure of financial fund investment. The central idea is that many
investors effectively transfer control over investment decisions to fund managers who
in turn are socially interacting, with the opinions of some fund managers carrying
greater weight than others, for instance because they manage larger funds or have
performed more successfully in the past. It turns out that the analytical mean-field
prediction used in Alfarano and Milakovic´ (2009) now significantly underestimates
the volatility in system-wide opinion dynamics. The key implication of this result is
that behavioral heterogeneity among interacting agents is not, as previously thought,
the exclusive source of endogenously arising volatility in agent-based herding mod-
els, but that the hierarchical structure of fund investment is an important auxiliary
source of financial volatility.
We take the position that investing in the presence of (actively managed) financial
funds basically corresponds to the hierarchical core-periphery networks we study
here. Investors who are not wealthy enough to afford a broadly diversified portfolio
of assets, those who participate in retirement plans, or those who simply feel that
they lack the skills or time to make investment decisions often invest in some type
or other of managed fund. Effectively such agents, who correspond to followers in
the periphery of the network, transfer their wealth to the fund managers in the core,
and ultimately allow those to make decisions for them. If fund managers socially
interact with their peers, and empirical evidence by Hong et al. (2005) and Wermers
(1999) strongly suggests that this is indeed the case, we arrive at the core-periphery
networks that we study in this paper.
Essentially, core-periphery networks will lead to an increase of system-wide volatil-
ity because fluctuations in a disproportionately small but central part of the network
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are amplified on a system-wide level. Therefore it seems rather ironic that investors
who want to ‘play it safe’ by investing in a variety of managed funds will actually
end up increasing system-wide volatility if they delegate investment decisions to
herding-prone fund managers.
2.2 Generic Herding Model
In a prototypical interaction-based herding model of the Kirman type, the agent
population of size N is divided into two groups, say, X and Y of sizes n and N − n,
respectively. The time evolution of the group sizes is modeled as a Markov chain,
characterized by a pair of transition rates that are sometimes also referred to as
birth and death rates. Depending on the particular financial market framework,
the two groups are typically labeled as fundamentalists and chartists, or optimists
and pessimists, or buyers and sellers. The basic idea is that agents change state for
personal reasons or under the influence of the neighbors with whom they socially
interact during a given time period. The transition rate for an agent i to switch
from state X to state Y in the Markov chain is
ω−i ≡ ρi(X → Y ) = ai + λi
∑
j 6=i
DY (i, j), (2.1)
where ai governs the possibility of self-conversion due to idiosyncratic factors, e.g.
the arrival of new information, while λi governs the interaction strength between i
and its neighbors. The function DY (i, j) is an indicator function serving to count
the number of i’s neighbors that are in state Y ,
DY (i, j) =
{
1 if j is a Y-neighbor of i,
0 otherwise,
(2.2)
hence the sum captures the (equally weighted) influence of the neighbors on agent
i. Symmetrically, the transition rates in the opposite direction are given by
ω+i ≡ ρi(Y → X) = ai + λi
∑
j 6=i
DX(i, j) . (2.3)
Let a =
∑
i ai/N and λ =
∑
i λi/N denote the averages of the behavioral pa-
rameters over agents, and let D denote the average number of neighbors per agent.
If all links are bi-directional, λi > 0∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, a mean-field argument (see
Alfarano and Milakovic´, 2009) shows that the transition rates for a single switch on
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the aggregated system-wide level are
ω− = n
(
a+
λD
N
(N − n)
)
, (2.4)
for a switch from X to Y , and symmetrically
ω+ = (N − n)
(
a+
λD
N
n
)
, (2.5)
for the reverse switch. An important result of the mean-field approach is that the
relative communication range D/N ultimately determines whether the Markov chain
is self-averaging or not. In the jargon of Alfarano et al. (2008), the non self-averaging
case corresponds to “non-extensive” transition rates with a constant relative com-
munication range, while the “extensive” transition rates, as in Kirman’s original
model, lead to self-averaging and hence to counter-factual statistics of returns.2 No-
tice that non-extensive transition rates depend on the respective occupation numbers
n and N−n, while extensive transition rates depend on the concentrations n/N and
(N−n)/N of agents in the opposite state, and therefore on the average communica-
tion range per time period in the network. This apparently minor modification has
a crucial impact on the aggregate properties of the herding model, as illustrated in
Figure 2.1. Hence, in contrast to Kirman’s original model, the generalized transition
rates (2.4) and (2.5) illustrate that network structure matters because the average
number of neighbors explicitly enters the transition rates.
At any time, the state of the system refers to the concentration of agents in one
of the two states, say, z = n/N , which can be treated as a continuous variable for
large N . None of the possible states of z ∈ [0, 1] is an equilibrium in itself nor are
there multiple equilibria in the orthodox economic sense. Equilibrium rather refers
to the stationary distribution of the birth and death process (2.4) and (2.5). The
distribution, that is the statistical equilibrium, describes the proportion of time the
system spends in state z and is known to be a Beta distribution (see, e.g., Alfarano
et al., 2008; Alfarano and Milakovic´, 2009, for a detailed derivation of the following
results),
pe(z) =
1
B(, )
z−1(1− z)−1, (2.6)
where B(, ) = Γ()2/Γ(2) is Euler’s Beta function. The qualitative behavior of
the process is parsimoniously encoded in the adimensional shape parameter  of the
2 The next section explains in more detail how the Markov chain typically enters Walrasian
models of the financial market.
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distribution
 =
aN
λD
. (2.7)
When  < 1, the distribution is bimodal with probability mass having maxima at
z = 0 and z = 1. For  > 1 the distribution is unimodal, and in the “knife-edge”
scenario  = 1 the distribution is uniform. The mean E[z] = 1/2 is independent of 
but the system exhibits very different characteristics depending on the modality of
the distribution. In the bimodal case, the system spends least of its time around the
mean, instead mostly exhibiting very pronounced herding in either of the extreme
states, as illustrated in the top panel of Figure 2.1. Finally, the variance of z,
V ar(z) = E(z2)− E(z)2 = 1
4(2+ 1)
=
[
4
(
2aN
λD
+ 1
)]−1
, (2.8)
is known to be a convenient summary measure of the model properties with respect
to an enlargement of system size. If the variance of z remains constant (or even
increases) when the system is enlarged, the leptokurtosis and volatility clustering
of returns will be preserved in a standard Walrasian model of market clearing. A
decreasing variance under enlargement of system size, on the other hand, is char-
acteristic of self-averaging and thus leads to counter-factual Gaussian properties of
returns, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2.1 and explained in more detail in
the following section.
2.3 Financial Market Framework
For the sake of completeness, we briefly discuss how the Markov chain of the previous
section would enter into a parsimonious model of an artificial financial market with
interacting heterogeneous agents, where it is typically used as a metaphor of infor-
mation diffusion among investors (see, e.g., Kirman, 1991,9; Alfarano et al., 2005;
Alfarano and Lux, 2007; Alfarano et al., 2008; Alfi et al., 2009; Irle et al., 2011, for
more realistic or detailed implementations). Suppose that market participants are
divided into two groups: the first group is populated by NF fundamentalists, who
buy (sell) assets when the price is below (above) its fundamental value PF . Their
excess demand for assets is given by EDF = NFγF log(PF/P ), where γF > 0 des-
ignates the sensitivity to deviations between the fundamental value and the market
price P . Without loss of generality, the fundamental price is assumed to be constant
over time. The second group is populated by NNT noise traders, who are essentially
driven by herd instincts in their investment strategies. Depending on their expec-
tations of future price movements, noise traders can be either optimists (subscript
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Fig. 2.1: Opinion dynamics in the herding model
The two panels on the top illustrate the time evolution of aggregate opinion dynamics
measured as the fraction of agents in one of the two states, say, z = n/N (top panel
N = 500, a = 0.5, λ = 1, D = N ; second panel N = 10000, a = 0.5, λ = 1, D = 500).
The two panels on the bottom exhibit the corresponding time series of returns generated
from a Walrasian pricing function, as for instance in Eq. (2.13) of Section 2.3 (with
κ = 1), where the level of excess demand depends on z. The bottom panel illustrates that
an enlargement of system size under extensive transition rates will lead to counter-factual
Gaussian returns and absence of volatility clustering.
O) or pessimists (subscript P). The excess demand of the noise trader group will be
proportional to their aggregated state, EDNT = γNT (NO −NP ), where NO and NP
are the numbers of optimists and pessimists, respectively, with NNT = NO + NP .
The parameter γNT > 0 governs the impact of the noise traders’ aggregate mood
on the asset price. In line with the notation of the previous section, EDNT can be
parameterized as a function of z = NO/NNT , that is the fraction of optimists over
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the total number of noise traders
EDNT = γNT ·NNT (2z − 1) . (2.9)
While the share of fundamentalists and noise traders is constant over time (so there
are no transitions between those two groups), switches from optimism to pessimism
and vice versa do take place among the noise traders, and are governed by the Markov
chain detailed in Section 2.2. Hence noise traders change their opinions about the
future prospects of an asset for idiosyncratic reasons or because of a tendency to
follow the majority opinion of their peers.
Assuming sluggish price adjustments by a market maker in the presence of excess
demand, one typically formalizes the price dynamics as
dP
P · dt = θ · ED = θ[EDF + EDNT ] , (2.10)
where θ is the speed of price adjustment. As an approximation to the resulting
disequilibrium dynamics, one may consider instantaneous market clearing (θ →∞)
or equivalently a Walrasian scenario (ED = 0) and solve (2.10) for the equilibrium
price
P = PF exp
[
NNT · γNT
NF · γF (2z − 1)
]
= PF exp [κ(2z − 1)] , (2.11)
where
κ =
NNT · γNT
NF · γF . (2.12)
Given a realization of the process z, we can see from (2.11) that periods of un-
dervaluation (compared to the fundamental price) will alternate with episodes of
overvaluation. In the first case the majority of noise traders are pessimists, while in
the second case most are optimists.
Finally, returns are typically defined as the log-increment of prices
r(t,∆t) = log
(
P (t+ ∆t)
P (t)
)
= κ∆z , (2.13)
and the third panel of Figure 2.1 shows the corresponding time series of log-returns
for a ‘small’ number of traders (NF = NNT = 500), visually already indicating
a leptokurtic return distribution and volatility clustering. In fact, Alfarano and
Lux (2007) have shown that this very simple model quantitatively reproduces the
stylized facts of financial returns with (i) a fat-tailed distribution of returns, (ii)
an absence of auto-correlation in raw returns, and (iii) a slowly decaying positive
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Fig. 2.2: A stylized representation of a hierarchical core-periphery network
Core agents (black; bi-directional links) influence each other in their opinion formation,
while peripheral followers (grey; uni-directional links) simply mimic their respective core
agents. This basically corresponds to a weighted version of Kirman’s original model.
auto-correlation in even functions of returns, i.e. volatility clustering. Increasing the
number of agents, for instance to NF = NNT = 10, 000 (keeping D = 500) as shown
in the bottom panel of Figure 2.1, turns the abrupt mood swings in z into much
smoother paths and results in counter-factual Gaussian fluctuations of returns.
2.4 Network Hierarchy and Core Weights
Essentially, we know that the relative communication range D/N in the transition
rates (2.4) and (2.5) determines whether or not the model is self-averaging. Alfarano
and Milakovic´ consider prototypical networks with bi-directional links, in particular
regular lattices, random graphs, small-world networks of the Watts and Strogatz
(1998) type, and the scale-free networks of Baraba´si and Albert (1999). Among
these it is merely the random graph that exhibits a constant relative communication
range since in that case D = N `, where ` designates the constant linking probability
among agents in the random graph. On the other hand, D/N approaches zero for
an increasing system size in the other network structures, unless one appropriately
changes the respective parameters in the generating mechanisms of these networks.
From a socio-economic viewpoint, however, it is not at all clear how or why a
complex system composed of many interacting agents could possibly coordinate an
appropriate system-wide change in these parameters. The random graph is not a
convincing mapping of socio-economic relationships either, because it implies that
the average connectivity of agents increases linearly with system size.3 Now sup-
3 A simple example illustrates this implausibility. Suppose you live in Smallville, where you
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pose instead that N core agents are still bi-directionally linked among themselves,
i.e. they still obey the Markov chain in Section 2.2. Additionally, each core agent
has a constant number W of followers in the periphery, with uni-directional links
emanating from the core to the periphery. Uni-directional linking implies that the
state of peripheral followers corresponds to the state of the respective core agents.
Then the total number of followers is W N = F , with a total of F + N agents in
the entire network. In this case, the system-wide concentration of agents in state X
will be
z =
Wn+ n
F +N
=
n(W + 1)
N(W + 1)
=
n
N
, (2.14)
which just amounts to a relabeling of variables. Put differently, in this special case
the system size F +N can be expanded at will by simply adding followers F without
encountering the self-averaging problem. Thus we preserve system-wide fluctuations
in a population of F+N individuals, although only N socially interacting core agents
are responsible for the fluctuations. At the same time, the hierarchical structure
avoids the empirically unsatisfactory random graph structure in the entire popula-
tion that would otherwise be necessary to preserve non self-averaging fluctuations.
The assumption of a constant number of followers per core agent, however, is quite
artificial and unsatisfactory. Therefore we want to investigate more general core-
periphery structures by randomly drawing the number of followers per core agent
from various distributions, keeping the total number of followers constant. We ex-
amine whether or how the dynamics of z change when the dispersion of followers
increases. Notice that the respective numbers of followers now act as weights in
the opinion formation process of core agents, otherwise we recover the unweighted
and already well-understood cases resulting in the large-N limit of the generalized
transition rates (2.4) and (2.5). Put differently, we would like to avoid the problem
of self-averaging when enlarging the system, but without taking recourse to random
graphs. Therefore we turn to core-periphery networks as a stylized representation
of the institutional structure of financial markets, and investigate whether these hi-
erarchical networks overcome the problem of self-averaging when the core remains
small relative to the periphery.
Figure 2.2 provides a stylized representation of the resulting core-periphery net-
works that reflect the organizational structure of managed fund investment. On one
hand, peripheral agents who invest in managed funds effectively delegate all sub-
sequent investment decisions to fund managers until they decide to withdraw their
closely interact with, say, thirty people. Moving to Metropolis, with a population about three
hundred times the size of Smallville, a constant linking probability would imply that you now
closely interact with a number of agents on the order of 105.
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capital again. On the other hand, the fund managers in the core influence each other
and are prone to herding effects, as in the empirical findings of Hong et al. (2005)
or Wermers (1999). We can also interpret the number of followers per core agent as
the size distribution of funds, thereby implicitly assuming that the influence of fund
managers on each other’s opinion is proportional to the size of the fund they are
managing. While we are not aware of evidence that directly supports this assump-
tion, the empirical size distribution of funds does in fact exhibit wide dispersion and
leptokurtosis (see, e.g., Gabaix et al., 2006; Schwarzkopf and Farmer, 2008).
2.5 Simulation Setup and Results
It is important to recall that we can study the (non) self-averaging property without
actually increasing the number of agents in our subsequent simulations, because the
addition of followers amounts to changing core agent weights. Notice that adding
core agents instead of followers would correspond to the scenario that Alfarano and
Milakovic´ (2009) already studied in detail, where the structure of the bi-directional
(core) network determines whether the model is self-averaging or not in the large N
limit. The introduction of weights, however, prevents a straightforward application
of their mean-field technique: when the weights are widely dispersed, the average
number of followers per core agent obviously no longer provides a good approxima-
tion. Therefore we simulate the opinion dynamics in various core-periphery models,
where we increase the dispersion of weights while drawing weights from different
distributions, or altering the network structure in the core. We compare the result-
ing variance of z both to the mean-field prediction and to the variance in another
limiting case that we have termed the independent one-leader scenario below.4 After
all, the variance of z is a useful summary measure of the different scenarios because
we know that if it decreases relative to the mean-field benchmark, the weighted
core-periphery networks will still suffer from the problem of self-averaging. If on
the other hand the variance of z remains constant, the hierarchical model will be
immune to self-averaging.
2.5.1 Network-Adapted Transition Rates
To implement individual transition probabilities, in line with the transition rates (2.1)
and (2.3), we first consider the (symmetric) adjacency matrix E = eij for i, j ∈
{1, . . . , N} that keeps track of the links or edges between core agents, with eij = 1 if
4 Appendix B.1 contains an analytical treatment of this case.
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i and j are neighbors and eij = 0 otherwise.
5 The key element in the implementation
of the transition rates is to determine for each agent i the number of neighbors that
are in the opposite state, say ni.
Let e(i) denote the i-th column of the adjacency matrix E, which basically
informs us of who is or is not an i-neighbor. While some of the neighbors will be
in the same state as agent i, others will be in the opposite state, and these are the
agents that we are interested in when implementing transition rates. To extract the
i-neighbors that are in the opposite state, consider the projection matrix S(i) of
dimension N ×N that keeps track of the i-neighbors that are in the opposite state:
that is, for each i the off-diagonal elements of S(i) are zero, sij = 0 if i 6= j, and
obviously sii = 0 as well; on the diagonal of S(i) we have sjj = 1 if the state of
neighbor j is opposite to that of agent i, and sjj = 0 otherwise. Then the column
vector k(i) = S(i) e(i) expresses which i-neighbors are in the opposite state, and we
finally have ni = k
T (i) k(i).
Thus in the absence of followers we would posit the transition probability p˜ii =
(a+λni)∆t for switching states on the individual level. To ensure that 0 ≤ p˜ii ≤ 1∀i,
we need ∆t ≤ 1/(a+λnmax) , where nmax designates the number of neighbors of the
node(s) with the highest degree in the network. Since an agent can be connected at
most to all other agents, we utilize the transition probability
p˜ii =
a+ λni
a+ λN
(2.15)
for individual switches, hence agent i’s probability to remain in the current state is
0 ≤ 1− p˜ii ≤ 1.
In the presence of followers, we first need to make sure that our simulation
results are comparable with the mean-field prediction arising from (2.15), hence the
individual transition probabilities need to be adapted to the core weights stemming
from the hierarchical network setup. Let the column vector w, with elements wi,
record the number of followers or weights for each core agent i, so F =
∑
iwi is the
total number of followers in the network, and let 〈f〉 = F/N be the average number
of followers per core agent. Now we are interested in the weighted sum of core
agents who are in the opposite state of an agent i, denoted fi. Since k(i) describes
the i-neighbors that are in the opposite state, the weighted sum of core agents in
the opposite state is straightforwardly computed as fi = k
T (i) w = eT (i) S(i) w,
and the probability pi to observe a change in the state of agent i in the weighted
5 By convention, eii = 0, so there are no ‘self-loops’ in the network.
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scenario is now given by
pii =
a+ λfi/ 〈f〉
a+ λN
(2.16)
Notice several points about the formulation of the herding term in the numerator
of (2.16). First, using the definition of 〈f〉, we can rewrite it as fi/ 〈f〉 = N fi/F .
Since 0 ≤ fi/F ≤ 1, we see that the denominator in (2.16) ensures 0 ≤ pii ≤
1∀i. Put differently, since 0 ≤ ni ≤ N , the weighted formulation has the same
boundaries as the unweighted one. Second, if all core agents have the same number
of followers, we have that ∀i fi = ni 〈f〉, so we recover the unweighted original
formulation (2.15). Third, the ratio fi/ 〈f〉 in the sum of (2.16) is a direct measure
of the dispersion of core weights, readily illustrating why we should not expect the
mean-field approximation to be accurate when the dispersion becomes large.6
2.5.2 Simulation Setup
In our simulations, we fix the number of core agents at N = 500 and draw the num-
ber of followers from Gaussian, uniform, exponential and Pareto distributions with
mean 〈f〉 = 1000 such that each randomly drawn number is rounded to the nearest
(absolute) integer value. Let N+ and F+ respectively denote the number of core
agents and followers that are in the optimistic state. The system-wide concentration
of agents in the optimistic state is now z = (N+ +F+)/M , where M = N +F is the
total number of agents. In all scenarios we set the parameters a, λ in such a way that
 = 1, which yields a uniform distribution of z with V ar(z) = 1/12 ≈ .083 when
the mean-field approximation applies. One ‘sweep’ of the system corresponds to one
round of sequential updating of all core agents in the system, thus requiring N steps
per sweep, and each simulation run consists of half a million sweeps. Finally, we
successively increase the standard deviation σf of the respective distribution while
ensuring that the weights remain positive and record the variance of z for each se-
quence of increasing σf . Recall again that when V ar(z) increases (decreases) above
(below) the “knife-edge” value of one twelfth, this implies that the distribution of
z transforms from a uniform to a bimodal distribution with non-trivial averaging
behavior (unimodal distribution with trivial self-averaging).
2.5.3 Core Structure and One-Leader Benchmark
The simulation results for a fully connected core are magnified in the inlay of Fig-
ure 2.3. When core weights are not overly dispersed, the mean-field prediction
still performs well, but pronounced deviations ultimately do occur as the dispersion
6 The source code of the algorithm can be found in Appendix B.2.
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Fig. 2.3: The impact of increasing heterogeneity in core weights
The simulations (with a fully connected core D = N and behavioral parameters a = λ = 1,
so  = 1) demonstrate that rising heterogeneity leads to increasing volatility, irrespective
of the particular distribution from which the weights are drawn.
of weights increases. Intuitively, this happens because a few core agents become
increasingly influential in the opinion formation dynamics of the system, thereby
increasing the time during which the system is near one of the two extreme states.
Hence hierarchical networks are not only immune to self-averaging, but actually am-
plify volatility in the system. It is noteworthy that the outcome does not depend on
the functional form of the distribution from which the weights are drawn.
In order to determine the limit of the variance amplification, we consider an
extreme case that we label as the one-leader scenario. In this case, we allocate
an equal number of followers to all but one core agent (the leader), who is then
assigned a weight such that the average number of followers corresponds again to
〈f〉 = 1000. Let 1/N < p < 1 denote the fraction of followers that are connected to
the one-leader, such that the leader has pF followers, and assume that the remaining
(1− p)F followers are allocated with equal weight among the N − 1 remaining core
agents. When p = 1/N , all core agents have the same number of followers, F/N .
Conversely when p→ 1, the system is almost entirely represented by the leader. In
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each new simulation run, we successively shift a larger number of followers to the
leader by increasing p. The result is shown in Figure 2.3, with V ar(z) intuitively
approaching a value of one-fourth since the leading agent will represent almost the
entire system by itself, and cannot be influenced by others anymore. Thus its actions
will consist of random switches between the two states, while the few remaining core
agents mimic the leader’s behavior. Hence the system spends half its time in one
state and half in the other, resulting in a variance of one-fourth.
In addition, we present some analytical results for the related benchmark sce-
nario of an independent leader who in a sense acts “outside” the core network: in
contrast to the preceding one-leader scenario, the independent leader now does not
care about the state of other core agents. We explain the details of this benchmark
setup and how we simulated it in Appendix B.1. Figure 2.3 also illustrates the
benchmark outcome of both the prediction and the simulation for the independent
leader scenario. In summary, the figure establishes two central results. First, the
mean-field approximation works reasonably well if the dispersion in the number of
followers is relatively small, that is when the core is fairly homogeneously weighted.
Second, a heterogeneously weighted core actually leads to increasing system-wide
volatility, asymptotically approaching the independent one-leader scenario, which
constitutes the most extreme degree of heterogeneity. The heterogeneity of core
agents thus represents an auxiliary source of fluctuations in the model. Basically, the
simulations establish the model’s behavior between the mean-field and independent
leader benchmarks, illustrating that the core-periphery setup quickly diverges from
the mean-field approximation and asymptotically approaches the independent leader
benchmark. The social interactions among core agents are crucial for overcoming
N -dependence, because a vanishing herding propensity would lead to independently
acting core agents, and thereby to a degenerate self-averaging distribution of their
aggregate opinion with a sharply peaked mean of one-half. Moreover, if the core
was enlarged (instead of the periphery) we would also confront the self-averaging
problem, unless the core network was the empirically unsatisfactory random graph.
It is therefore the contemporaneous presence of a hierarchical network with a rela-
tively small core, and the social interactions in the core that ultimately overcomes
the problem of N -dependence.
2.5.4 Varying the Core Structure
Our previous investigations show that a hierarchical network with a fully connected
core not only overcomes the self-averaging problem, but also amplifies volatility.
A remaining issue is whether these results are robust with respect to the network
2. Institutional Hierarchy and Volatility in Financial Markets 30
structure in the core itself. On that account, we perform another series of simulations
with varying core network structures, and record how the different core networks
respond to an increasing dispersion of weights.
For comparison with our previous findings we keep the size of the core fixed at
N = 500, and construct the following networks in the core: a circle with neigh-
borhood forty, a random network with linking probability of ten percent, and a
scale-free network with an average of five thousand links. For the random and the
scale-free graph we construct ten different realizations of the core network, and run
the simulations again for half a million sweeps, subsequently averaging over the ten
respective core realizations. The details of the respective network parametrizations
are not crucial, because in each scenario we set λ = 1 in the transition rates (2.16),
and adapt the behavioral parameter a in light of a particular parametrization of D
such that the mean-field prediction would again yield a uniform distribution ( = 1).
The simulation results in Figure 2.4 demonstrate that core network structure has
merely second-order effects on the macroscopic properties of the model. As be-
fore, an increasing dispersion of followers increases volatility, while the mean-field
prediction holds true if the dispersion of weights is not too large.
We also simulated a very extreme scenario by considering a scale-free graph with
deterministically assigned core weights that are proportional to the degree of a core
agent. We can think of such a proportional weights structure as the asymptotic limit
of positive feedback effects in the time evolution of the network, for instance if highly
central core agents increasingly attract the interest and wealth of investors, or if core
agents with a large weight become increasingly connected among their peers in the
core. Whatever the ultimate reason might be for observing such a double-weighted
hierarchy, it is noteworthy that volatility increases considerably compared to the
other scenarios shown in Figure 2.4, even for very small deviations in the number of
followers.
2.6 Discussion
Hierarchical core-periphery structures turn out to overcome the problem of N -
dependence in probabilistic herding models of the Kirman type. On one hand,
this is good news from the viewpoint of the model’s asymptotic properties, because
one is able to replicate the stylized facts of financial returns with behaviorally het-
erogeneous agents for any system size, without having to tune any of the behavioral
parameters. On the other hand, our findings have somewhat stark implications
from the viewpoint of investment strategy, and they also raise pressing new ques-
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Fig. 2.4: Influence of network structure on volatility
The impact of different core network structures on system-wide volatility has merely second-
order effects, except for the “proportional weights” scenario: if the core is a scale-free graph
with core weights that are proportional to the degree of each agent in the core, the mean-
field approximation immediately fails to produce accurate results and the variance of z
rapidly increases, almost doubling compared to the other scenarios where core weights are
still randomly assigned when varying the network structure in the core. As before, the
simulations were conducted for N = 500 agents with λ = 1, and a and D set in such a
way that  = 1.
tions about the origins of hierarchical network structures.
The introduction of hierarchical network structures represents an additional
source of volatility on top of the behavioral heterogeneity that has previously been
considered as the exclusive source of volatility in social interaction models. If one
accepts our premise that hierarchical networks are a useful representation of fund
investor relationships in financial markets, then popular and traditional investment
advice to ‘diversify one’s portfolio’ has to be judged with caution. Investors who are
not wealthy enough to broadly diversify their portfolios, those who participate in
funded retirement plans, or those who simply feel that they lack the skills or time to
make appropriate investment decisions might very well delegate their investment de-
cisions to institutional investors. But if these fund managers are socially interacting
and influencing each other in their investment decisions, as the quoted empirical ev-
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idence suggests, this becomes a self-defeating strategy because we have argued that
system-wide volatility increases under such circumstances. Put in more provocative
terms, all the good intentions of investors to diversify risk can lead to the opposite
effect if fund managers are prone to social interaction effects. Moreover, the pres-
ence of positive feedback effects in the time evolution of hierarchical networks seems
to worsen the situation further, rather than improving it, since positive feedbacks
would significantly increase the level of volatility in our simulations.
From the viewpoint of policy-making, our study indicates that a reduction of
financial volatility would be facilitated by a shrinking degree of hierarchical or-
ganization in financial markets, corresponding to an increasing decentralization of
investment decisions. While such advice sounds straightforward in principle, its
implementation would most likely be more painful and complex: our results sug-
gest that already very small values of p (or market share for that matter) lead to
a sudden and pronounced increase in volatility. Keeping p very close to zero, on
the other hand, would more or less imply getting rid of managed funds altogether,
which hardly appears to be a feasible option.
3. PERSISTENCE OF A NETWORK CORE IN THE TIME
EVOLUTION OF INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES
3.1 Introduction to Corporate Board Networks
We study the time evolution of German corporate director interlocks between 1993
and 2005, and detect a persistent core of directors who are highly central in the
network while being densely connected among themselves. The statistical properties
of the network core show little variation over time in spite of significant changes in
corporate governance and considerable turnover in the identity of core directors,
leading to questions about the mechanisms that are responsible for the origin of a
persistent network core.
Traditional research in organization and management science has investigated
the influence of shared directorships or ownerships on firm performance, profitabil-
ity, and corporate strategy, including acquisition behavior, choice of financing, the
magnitude and direction of political and charitable contributions, the adoption of
poison pill practices, and many more, in fact generating such an abundance of results
to warrant several recent surveys on different aspects of the subject (see, e.g., Bor-
gatti and Foster, 2003; Brass et al., 2004; Galaskiewicz, 2007; Provan et al., 2007).
Another strand of research, inspired by the interdisciplinary work of Baraba´si and
Albert (1999), has emphasized the statistical properties of corporate networks (see,
e.g., Battiston and Catanzaro, 2004; Caldarelli and Catanzaro, 2004; Newman et al.,
2001) and concludes that director interlocks exhibit the small world effect, whereby
the interpersonal distance between any two directors is several orders of magnitude
smaller than the number of directors in the network. In addition, Davis et al. (2003)
argue that director interlocks are also characterized by a high degree of clustering,
typical of the small world networks introduced by Watts and Strogatz (1998).1 Sub-
sequently, however, Conyon and Muldoon (2006) and Robins and Alexander (2004)
have shown from different yet complementary viewpoints that the high degree of
clustering is present by construction, and should as such not be an unexpected
feature in director interlocks. Intuitively, the reason is that directors of the same
1 See Uzzi et al. (2007) for a review of small world networks in the social sciences.
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company are linked by definition to all their colleagues, while the large majority of
directors serves only on a single board in the network.
Conventional wisdom thus has it that the small world effect typically stems from
the presence of ‘hubs’, i.e. nodes with a large number of links to other nodes in
the network, and the degree distribution of nodes has been shown to obey a power
law in many complex networks (see, e.g., the surveys by Newman, 2003; Schnettler,
2009). Still, in numerous social contexts the number of links and nodes exhibits a
characteristic scale and does not span enough orders of magnitude to be a power law.
In addition, the cost of forming a link on the World Wide Web or in an academic
citation network is very small compared to the amount of resources that are involved
in the hiring of corporate directors. Power-law degree distributions are in a strong
combinatorial sense the most likely distributions when links are relatively costless,
yet as links become costlier the functional form of the most likely degree distribution
becomes an exponential (see Venkatasubramanian et al., 2005). Thus it seems fair
to say that power laws are an inadequate or at best imperfect explanation for the
small world property of director interlocks.
To understand the origins of the small world effect in director interlocks, we
find it instructive to follow the approach of Milakovic´ et al. (2010). They start
from the fact that the large majority of directors serves on a single board, and
ask whether the observed instances of multiple board membership deviate from a
random benchmark. The benchmark assumes that board recruitment decisions are
entirely random in the sense that each director is equally likely to obtain an addi-
tional board appointment, turning multiple board membership into a sequence of
Bernoulli trials. The resulting binomial distribution and the empirically observed
distribution display deviations over increasing orders of magnitude in each year of
our sample, and it turns out that directors with multiple board memberships are to
a very large extent connected among themselves, making them highly central in the
overall network. From this viewpoint, the small world property of director interlocks
is due to a relatively small number of ‘big players’ who are densely connected among
themselves, thereby forming a core network that substantially shortens the distance
between arbitrarily chosen directors in the entire network. While Milakovic´ et al.
show the existence of a network core in a more recent year, they lack observations on
the time evolution of the board and director networks. One of the main findings of
the present paper is that institutional ties among the largest German companies are
maintained over time in spite of considerable turnover in the identity of directors.
In light of this turnover, it becomes important to understand the origins of a persis-
tent network core, and our analysis suggests that both the reconstruction of broken
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ties among large corporations, as well as their preference for recruiting experienced
directors with multiple board memberships, are responsible for the time persistence
of a network core.
Finally, the idea that a core of director interlocks influences the degree of interest
group formation has previously been put forward by Mintz and Schwartz (1981), and
several authors have suggested procedures to classify or identify a core of key players
in complex networks, both in the social sciences (see, e.g., Borgatti, 2006; Borgatti
and Everett, 1999) and in interdisciplinary physics (see, e.g., Holme, 2005). But the
existence of a network core also has implications beyond pressure group formation,
particularly for a class of diffusion processes sometimes referred to as duplication
in walks (see, e.g., Borgatti, 2005). An important illustration of such a process is
the diffusion of states (e.g. expectations, tastes, opinions, trading positions, etc.)
in a system made up of a large number of interacting heterogeneous agents. One
can show, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, that the existence of a core is often
sufficient for the system-wide propagation of fashions and fads in such systems (see,
e.g., Alfarano and Milakovic´, 2009; Alfarano et al., 2012), while more traditional
network features like average clustering, diameter, small world coefficient, or degree
distributions are not. The presence of a hierarchical core-periphery structure can
oftentimes lead to system-wide conformity, including the possibility that the social
interactions of core agents lead to coordinated “animal spirits” in a system that is
several orders of magnitude larger than the size of the core. We believe that the
potential implications of our empirical results are best discussed in light of this latter
point.
There is quite some evidence that the corporate network, especially in Germany,
is in a state of decline. The increased shareholder orientation of companies, the
strategic reorientation of big banks, and the decreasing influence of the state in the
infrastructure sector are made accountable for this process (see, e.g., Heemskerk,
2007; Beyer and Ho¨pner, 2003). In the remainder of this chapter we will see that this
decline is for real, but we also claim that the mechanism which keeps the corporate
network alive is still present. After a description of the dataset we will proceed by
identifying and comparing cores of directors for the different subsamples in Section
3.3. In Section 3.4 we will analyze how the process of re-wiring throughout the years
takes place.
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3.2 The Dataset
Our compilation of board composition data aimed for Germany’s one hundred largest
publicly traded companies in 1993, 1999, and 2005. The thirty largest compa-
nies are listed in the German stock index DAX (Deutscher Aktienindex ), while the
next largest companies are listed in the Mid-Cap-DAX, or MDAX. The MDAX was
founded in 1996, containing the seventy largest companies that were not included in
the DAX, which we also used in the 1993 sample. In 2003, the number of companies
in the MDAX was reduced from seventy to fifty, so we used the survivors among the
twenty companies that left the MDAX in the 2005 sample, or replaced those that
no longer existed with the next largest companies in 2005.
For the purpose of our study, corporate boards consist of executive manage-
ment (Vorstand) and supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). According to the pertinent
German legal code, they have to meet at least four times per year (§ 94(3) of Ak-
tiengesetz, or AktG). Executives are appointed for a maximum of five years, and
both appointment as well as potential reappointment need to be approved by the
supervisory board (§ 84 AktG). In light of the five-year limit, we chose equally spaced
intervals of six years to increase the likelihood of observing changes in the compo-
sition of corporate boards. We compiled the data by consulting various archives
that keep records of the annual reports of these companies, and by writing to com-
panies for whom we could not locate annual reports.2 The descriptive statistics of
our sample, reported in Table 3.2, show a decreasing average board size over time,
which is mainly due to M&A activity among very large corporations,3 and also to
the fact that 2005 additions had only about half the sample’s average board size in
that year.
Let n be the number of directors in a year, and let c be the number of companies
in that year. Then the incidence matrix M of dimension n × c, with mij = 1 if
director i is on the board of company j and zero otherwise, describes the corporate
network in each year. The projection onto directors, D = MMT, is the weighted
adjacency matrix of director interlocks. Its diagonal entries equal the total number
of board memberships of director i, while non-zero entries off the diagonal of D
represent the weight of a link, showing on how many boards two directors serve to-
gether. Symmetrically the projection onto boards, B = MTM, yields the weighted
adjacency matrix of company interlocks, its diagonal entries correspond to the board
2 Three companies in the 1993 sample did not reply to our inquiry, all three of them with
relatively minor market capitalization, leaving us with 97 companies in that year.
3 Dresdner Bank, for instance, was acquired by Allianz in the financial sector, while VEBA and
VIAG merged to EON in the utilities industry.
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1993 1999 2005
# of companies (distinct: 176) 97 100 100
# of directors (distinct: 3884) 1744 1711 1593
# of mandates 2143 2044 1833
average board size 22.9 20.4 18.3
average mandates per director 1.23 1.17 1.15
Company links (total) 803 657 375
Company links (unweighted) 597 490 291
Tab. 3.1: Mandates statistics
The descriptive statistics of our sample illustrate a slight decrease in the number of di-
rectors and mandates over time, and a highly nonlinear decrease in the number of links
between companies that are formed by multiple board membership. The non-linearity is
caused by the fact that a director with b mandates creates l(b) = b!/2(b − 2)! links among
companies. If, for instance, a director with b = 6 mandates retires and is replaced by
different single-mandate directors each time, then l(6) = 15 links are removed from the
network.
size of company j, and off-diagonal non-zero elements indicate the number of direc-
tors that two companies have in common. The resulting networks are displayed in
Figure 3.1 and readily reveal the existence of a core in each period, but the figure
also suggests that the number of core companies and directors decreases over time.
The question is then whether, as one might intuitively expect, core directors also be-
come less influential in the sense that they are less central or less densely connected
among themselves.
3.3 Analysis of Cores of Directors
3.3.1 Random Benchmark
To tackle the issue, we first need to identify a core of directors. For this purpose,
it is instructive to consider the frequency of multiple board memberships, shown in
Figure 3.2.
We start from the observation that the vast majority of directors serves on just
one board, and conduct a simple thought experiment. Suppose that the directors
in each sample are indistinguishable; then we can determine the probability of ob-
serving multiple board membership as a sequence of k independent Bernoulli trials,
resulting in a binomial distribution for observing B = b additional board member-
ships,
Pr[B = b] =
(
k
b
)
pb (1− p)k−b,
3. Persistence of a Network Core in the Time Evolution of Interlocking Directorates 39
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ æ
æ æ æ
à
à
à
à
à
à
à
à
à
ì
ì
ì
ì
ì
ì
ì
ì
ì
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ò
ô
ô
ô
ô ô
ô
ô
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
ç
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
10-4
0.01
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No. of board memberships b
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Hem
pi
ric
al
v
s.
bi
no
m
ia
lb
en
ch
m
ar
kL
ç 2005 binomial
ô 2005 empirical
ò 1999 binomial
ì 1999 empirical
à 1993 binomial
æ 1993 empirical
Fig. 3.2: Board membership benchmark
The top curves show the empirical relative frequency of multiple board membership in each
of the three years, while the bottom curves illustrate the binomial probability of observing
multiple board membership in the respective sequences of independent Bernoulli trials de-
scribed in the text. The semi-log scale reveals deviations on increasing orders of magnitude
for b > 3.
where p is the probability of success, i.e. of obtaining an additional board member-
ship. To illustrate the procedure, consider for example the year 1993: there are 1744
directors in total, and the number of mandates is 2143, yielding k = 2143− 1744 =
399, and p = 1/1744. Figure 3.2 illustrates the resulting binomial distributions and
compares them to the empirical relative frequencies of multiple board membership.
For b > 3, the incidence of multiple board membership is several orders of mag-
nitude higher than we would expect in a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials,
which suggests that directors with three or more mandates are probabilistically dis-
tinct and in some sense special. One would expect to observe a network core if
these directors were connected among themselves, thus we plot the network struc-
ture among directors with B ≥ b board memberships in Figure 3.3, which reveals
that the resulting sub-graphs, or b-cores,4 are indeed to a very large extent con-
nected. We also observe that both the number of directors and the fraction of
4 Notice that our b-cores are different from so-called k-cores, which are constructed using a node’s
minimum degree (see, e.g., Seidman, 1983).
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The number of directors in the respective b-cores (top panel) decreases over time, as well as
the fraction of companies that are linked by the respective b-core directors (bottom panel).
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companies that are connected by the respective core directors decrease over time in
our sample, shown in Figure 3.4. A major contributing factor to this development
is certainly the recent reform of Germany’s corporate governance code (DCGK).5
The reform deals with a number of national and international criticisms that have
been leveled against Germany’s traditional corporate governance, mostly concerning
the inadequate focus on shareholder interests, and the inadequate independence of
supervisory boards, addressed for instance in DCGK paragraphs 5.1.2 (age limit for
management board service), 5.4.2 (independence of supervisory board members),
and 5.4.4 (deterrence of the hitherto custom that former chief executives serve as
supervisory board chairmen). While the new code aims at standardizing best prac-
tices in corporate governance, it does not have the status of a formally binding law.
Nevertheless, deviations from DCGK rules have to be explicitly justified and pub-
licized on an annual basis (§ 161 AktG), and the observed decrease in the average
number of board memberships is not an unexpected feature from this perspective.
It is noteworthy that the code took effect in early 2002, while the pronounced de-
crease in average mandates indeed occurs between the 1999 and 2005 samples. At
this point, one can speculate whether the DCGK is the ultimate cause of these de-
velopments or not, yet over the years we do in fact observe a pronounced decline
in executive managers’ supervisory board memberships:6 Table C.2 in the appendix
shows that in 1993 (1999, 2005), the 569 (441, 457) directors with executive positions
additionally served on 228 (164, 83) supervisory boards of other corporations. The
drop in the ratio of supervisory board memberships per executive (228/569 = 0.4 in
1993, 0.3 in 1999 and 0.17 in 2005) illustrates that corporate governance practices
have indeed changed over the investigated time period. This brings us back to the
question whether shrinking b-core sizes also imply that core directors become less
influential over time, and how to formally define a network core in the first place.
3.3.2 Density and Corporate Reach
Intuitively a network core consists of directors that are highly central in the network
and densely connected among themselves. The density of the (unweighted) graph
D is given by the ratio of the existing number of links, denoted |L|, to the number
of links in a complete graph of the same size, denoted |N |,
densityD = 2|L|/|N |(|N | − 1), (3.1)
5 See http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/index-e.html.
6 Current members of the management board must not simultaneously serve on the company’s
supervisory board (§ 105 AktG), but have routinely been allowed to serve as supervisory board
members at other companies.
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Fig. 3.5: Core companies and core directors
The (normalized) density of b-cores (top panel) remains fairly stable over time, as well
as the ratio of distinct core companies to core directors (bottom panel). If anything, core
density and core power increase despite the decrease in the average number of mandates
over time.
3. Persistence of a Network Core in the Time Evolution of Interlocking Directorates 44
which is by construction confined to the interval [0, 1]. The top panel of Figure 3.5
illustrates that (i) the density of b-core sub-graphs increases with b, and that (ii)
the density of the respective b-cores remains fairly constant over time in spite of de-
creasing b-core size. In addition, we can assess the corporate reach per core director
by the ratio of distinct core companies to the number of core directors, the rationale
being that a core of densely connected directors probably yields the more institu-
tional power the fewer individuals constitute the core, and the more companies they
span. It is noteworthy that this measure of core power, shown in the bottom panel of
Figure 3.5, actually increases over time, so the recent decline in the number of board
memberships does not necessarily mean that core directors in Germany’s corporate
board network also become less influential.
3.3.3 Centrality
A complementary approach to measuring the importance or influence of directors
is to consider their centrality in the overall network of director interlocks. Let C
denote the respective adjacency matrices of the large connected components of D
in the respective years, and let V denote the set of directors contained in C. A
shortest path between two directors u, v ∈ V is known as a graph geodesic, which
is not necessarily unique, and the length of the geodesic dC(u, v) is known as the
graph distance between the pair (u, v). The first centrality measure we consider is
closeness centrality, which measures the distance of a node to all other nodes in the
network, and is typically defined as the reciprocal of the sum of geodesics to all other
nodes in the network,
closenessu = 1/
∑
v∈V
dC(u, v) . (3.2)
Since we would like to compare the centrality of directors across years, we divide by
the closeness score of the director with maximal closeness centrality in each year in
order to normalize the scores. Directors who are more central in this sense should
in principle be better able to reach out into the entire network or be faster in doing
so.
Another measure of the centrality of node u is degree centrality, constructed by
summing the number of links that each node has, degreeu =
∑
v∈V Cuv. Intuitively,
directors who have many links compared to their peers are in an advantageous posi-
tion if they are able to influence many of their peers, or if they have better access to
resources through their many links. But degree centrality only takes immediate ties
of directors into account, and lacks information about the distance to directors that
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Fig. 3.6: Centrality of directors
Normalized average centrality measures of b-core directors in the respective years: closeness
(top), degree (center) and eigenvector (bottom) centrality remain fairly stable over time.
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are not immediate neighbors. Moreover, directors with many board memberships
have a relatively large degree by construction since the board size distribution has
a characteristic scale that is well captured by its mean.
Therefore, we also compute the eigenvector centrality (see Bonacich, 1972) for all
nodes in V . Eigenvector centrality assigns scores of relative importance to directors
in the network, based on the principle that connections to high-scoring directors
contribute more to a director’s score than equal connections to low-scoring peers.
Hence the idea behind eigenvector centrality is that the quality of links is important,
because directors who are connected to many influential peers can be expected to be
important themselves. Suppose the eigenvector centrality score of node u, denoted
eu, is proportional to the centrality score of its neighbors,
eu =
1
λ
∑
v∈V
Cuv ev , (3.3)
where λ is a constant. Then we can write the vector of centrality scores in matrix
notation as λe = C ·e, which shows that e is an eigenvector of C with corresponding
eigenvalue λ. It is convenient to consider the eigenvector corresponding to the largest
eigenvalue of C since its elements are all non-negative according to the Perron-
Frobenius theorem. Again, we divided all scores by the maximum score in each year
to normalize the data. Figure 3.6 shows that core directors are not only densely
connected among themselves, but that they are also increasingly central in the entire
network, which is another characteristic that one intuitively expects in the definition
of a network core.
3.4 Core Persistence and Individual Turnover
We have argued that the structural characteristics of director interlocks are stable
over time in spite of changes in corporate governance and a decrease in the average
number of mandates. Motivated by the persistence in network structure, we want to
investigate whether or how the core structure depends on the destinies of particular
agents.
3.4.1 Evolution of Company Links
An important aspect here concerns the links in the company network. Their time
evolution over consecutive periods reveals some noteworthy patterns: in 1993 (1999)
the company network had 597 (490) unweighted links, 290 (195) of which were with
companies that remained in the sample in the next period (and had not merged
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in the meantime), while 141 (95) of these links were still in place in the following
period. In 78 (62) cases, at least one director was constantly part of both boards. In
addition, 24 (10) directors had been recruited to reinforce existing links, then serving
on average on 4.38 (4.04) boards. Out of these 24 (10) directors, 18 (7) were already
serving on at least one board in the previous period, when they held 2.22 (2.68)
appointments on average. In the remaining 63 (33) cases, where an existing link was
maintained through the recruitment of new directors, a total of 50 (26) directors was
appointed to the 63 (33) positions, and these directors then served on average on 4.04
(3.77) boards. Out of these 50 (26) directors, 34 (20) had at least one mandate in the
previous period, when they served on average on 2.68 (2.75) boards. So we observe
that about half of the company links are being maintained between periods, which is
consistent with earlier findings by Schreyo¨gg and Papenheim-Tockhorn (1995) on the
reconstitution of German corporate interlocks.7 Keeping in mind that a substantial
number of links in the (initial) company network might be unintended,8 and given
that the sample periods have been chosen sufficiently far apart to warrant board
(re)appointment decisions, the observed reconstitution of links would certainly seem
to indicate planned or strategic connectivity among German corporations.
Secondly, these figures suggest that companies seem to prefer the appointment
of directors who already serve on several other boards, which is particularly true
for the maintenance of institutional links over time. It is rather doubtful that these
directors were appointed for purely supervisory purposes since the effort involved
in monitoring a handful of DAX companies is surely considerable, and in all like-
lihood becomes increasingly prohibitive if one of the appointments is an executive
position. The frequency distribution of executives’ supervisory board memberships
in Table C.2 nevertheless shows that some executives additionally served on up to
ten other boards.
3.4.2 Director Survival
Since multiple board memberships seem to be essential for both the existence and
the persistence of a core network, we also investigate the survival of directors over
7 The percentage of reconstructed ties among German companies is four to five times higher than
previously observed in the US (see Stearns and Mizruchi, 1986). From a network core perspective, it
would be interesting to clarify whether the percentage of reconstituted ties among the very largest
(core) corporations in the US is substantially higher than in the original Stearns and Mizruchi
sample.
8 Imagine a director with three mandates and suppose that she is on the board of company A,
which manages to place her on the board of company B for strategic reasons, e.g. to oversee A’s
interests. If she also serves on the board of a third company C, we consider the link between A
and B intentional, while the links AC and BC are unintentional byproducts.
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time. Out of a total of 1517 directors in the 1993 sample, 518 are still present in
1999, which is a survival rate of 34%. For the 1999-2005 transition, this figure is
32%. During the first (second) transition period, 12.6% (13.1%) of the surviving
directors gained mandates, while 12.4% (11.3%) lost at least one mandate. But
these percentages conceal that directors with multiple memberships have a markedly
higher survival probability than the vast majority of directors with a single mandate:
the survival probability conditional on the number of existing mandates is 31% (28%)
for board members with a single mandate, it increases to 51% (47%) for directors
with two mandates, 69% (76%) for those with three mandates, and 70% (78%)
for those with four or more mandates.9 It seems fair to say that the persistent
structure of Germany’s corporate network is driven by the recruitment decisions of
large companies, which are characterized by a process of “selective replacement”
that expresses itself in the figures on the maintenance of links among companies and
the conditional survival of directors. While the vast majority of directors enters and
exits the corporate network without ever being particularly central in it, a small
number of highly connected key directors warrants a persistent network core over
time. Moreover, fluctuations in the destines of key players are mitigated by the
reconstitution of ties among large corporations, who favor directors with multiple
memberships. To corroborate this claim, we consider the turnover in the centrality
of companies and directors between periods.
3.4.3 Turnover in Company and Director Centrality
We start by calculating the change in each of the three centrality measures for sur-
viving nodes in the connected component. Table 3.2 illustrates that about two thirds
of the companies but only one third of the directors survive consecutive periods. The
life span of directors is biologically limited while the same is obviously not neces-
sarily true for corporations, thus the fact that about 70% of directors but less than
40% of companies drop out between periods is by itself not unexpected. In spite
of the expected difference, we find that the mean absolute change in centrality, as
a measure of variability among survivors, has the same level of magnitude for both
companies and directors, and that absolute changes in centrality are rather small in
both cases.10
In order to properly compare the turnover activity between companies and direc-
9 These figures are easily calculated from the transition matrices in Appendix C.3.
10 All three measures of centrality exhibit a slight decrease in average centrality between 1993 to
1999, and an increase between 1999 to 2005, as reported in Table 3.2. This is in line with the visual
inspection of the network structure in Figure 3.1, which shows an increasing number of peripheral
nodes in 1999, and denser cores in 2005.
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tors, we need to scale the absolute changes in centrality with a benchmark measure
of persistence in centrality that accounts for the different scales of the company and
director networks. In our benchmark case, we assume that each node’s centrality
could change to every observed centrality in next period’s sample with equal prob-
ability, corresponding to a uniformly random rewiring of nodes. Thus the average
absolute change in centrality would be zero in the case of a perfect conservation of
the relative position of nodes, and would be equal to the benchmark value in case
of a completely random rewiring of surviving nodes. For all centrality measures, we
observe that the ratio of the benchmark to the observed value is larger for compa-
nies than for directors (about 3:1 vs 2:1), showing that surviving companies exhibit
significantly less churning in their centrality than surviving directors. Comparing
dropouts with survivors, both for companies and directors, we find that survivors
are always substantially more central than dropouts (also reported in Table 3.2),
and that the normalized degree is about one order of magnitude higher for survivors
than for dropouts. Moreover, the very low average eigenvector centrality of dropouts
further implies that the importance of the dropouts’ few neighbors is also very low
on average. In summary, both highly central companies as well as directors tend to
stay central, while dropouts are located in more peripheral positions of the network.
Company networks exhibit less turnover activity than director networks both in the
share of surviving nodes but also in the centrality changes among survivors.
3.4.4 Identifying Company Groups
Finally, we would like to identify cliques among the companies in our dataset. There
are essentially two streams of literature which deal with the detection of groups in
networks (see, e.g., Newman, 2010, pp. 345–391). The traditional approach is called
graph partitioning and splits the network into a fixed number of subgraphs, e.g. by
spectral decomposition of the so-called Graph Laplacian (see, e.g., von Luxburg,
2007).11 Graph partitioning algorithms can become very time consuming, but the
more serious concern is conceptual because the number of useful partitions is gen-
erally not known. Community detection therefore has developed algorithmic pro-
cedures that endogenize the number of subgraphs in the partitioning process, for
instance by iterative edge removal based on the calculation of betweenness scores
(see, e.g., Newman and Girvan, 2004). We employ a mixture of these two approaches
here, starting from a principal component analysis (PCA) and combining it with
a scoring algorithm that creates groups based on the largest components without
11 The Laplacian is a special form of the adjacency matrix of the network, where the trace of the
Laplacian corresponds to the number of links between nodes.
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Fig. 3.7: Resorted adjacency matrices for 1993, 1999, and 2005
The network is getting sparser over the years. The number and size of identified cliques is
decreasing.
predefining the number of subgraphs. A combination of PCA and some matching
algorithm represents a reasonable alternative to community detection algorithms
in the social sciences, because the size of datasets is generally smaller than in the
natural sciences.12
First we take the adjacency matrix of the firm network and standardize its
columns by subtracting the column-wide mean and dividing by the standard de-
viation of column entries. This new adjacency matrix is denoted Bˆ. The column
entries can now be interpreted as the relative weights of the companies’ links, while
the row entries resemble the relative attention a firm receives through links from
other firms. We measure the correlations of link patterns by calculating the empir-
ical correlation matrix R = c−1BˆT Bˆ, allowing us to infer which firms have similar
relative weights in their link patterns. Based on this correlation matrix we compute
our new variables, the principal components F, which are linear combinations of the
original variables such that F = YBˆ. The column vectors in Y carry the weights for
each new variable, and it can be shown that the solution to this problem amounts
to solving for F = VBˆ, where Y = V contains the eigenvectors of the correlation
matrix R ordered by descending eigenvalues (see, e.g., Jobson, 1991). The eigenvec-
tors with the highest eigenvalues account for a large amount of the variance in the
data, while low eigenvalues stand for eigenvectors and components that contribute
very little to the variance and are consequently neglected.
To illustrate the principles that we use to form groups, assume that based on
some decomposition we have approximated the adjacency matrix B by a dimension-
ally reduced matrix Eˆ, where both matrices would contain ones for links and zeros
otherwise, and Eˆ being of lower rank than B due to the dimensional reduction. To
12 The benefit of this method is that PCA is more parsimonious and transparent than community
detection algorithms, and perhaps also better known among social scientists than the latter. The
foundations of our subsequent analysis can be found in Reichardt (2009).
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decide whether Eˆ is a good representation of the original network, we essentially have
to compare and score by rewarding the correct matching of links (and non-links) in
B and Eˆ, and symmetrically by punishing the matching of links to non-links in
either direction. A weighting scheme will be helpful for the comparison because the
adjacency matrices of our corporate networks are sparse, therefore actual links are
more informative than non-links. These considerations result in a scoring (or error)
function of the form
s(Eˆ|B,Ω1...4) =
c∑
i=1
c∑
j=1
Ω1,ijEˆijBij︸ ︷︷ ︸
links to links
−
c∑
i=1
c∑
j=1
Ω2,ij(1− Eˆij)Bij︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-links to links
(3.4)
−
c∑
i=1
c∑
j=1
Ω3,ijEˆij(1−Bij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
links to non-links
+
c∑
i=1
c∑
j=1
Ω4,ij(1− Eˆij)(1−Bij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-links to non-links
where Ω1...4 represent weighting matrices. It is common to focus on the matching of
links in the reference matrix B by equally weighting the (mis)matching of original
links, Ω1,ij = Ω2,ij > Ω3,ij = Ω4,ij (see Reichardt, 2009).
The algorithmic procedure that we employ here to visualize the groups in the
network follows exactly the principles illustrated above. The only difference is that
instead of comparing two (binary) adjacency matrices, we compare the adjacency
matrix with the principal components (which are not binary) in column-wise fashion.
The groups to which we want to match firms are given by the largest components
resulting from the PCA. Since Bˆ describes links, the components in F describe
those links in which companies differ. If we normalize the column vectors in F and
allow for a sign change in every column, we get a new matrix of link profiles Fˆ
with dimensions c× 2c, where each even column contains the entries of the previous
(i.e. original, now odd) column with reversed signs. This sign change is necessary
since the principal components describe only a new axis within the variable space,
but do not inform us of the direction. As detailed below, we will only use the first
few columns of Fˆ and calculate a similarity score for each group (represented by
a column in Fˆ) and each firm (represented by a column in B). This results in a
matrix S of scores for all firms and groups with dimension c × 2k, where k is the
number of included principal components (more on k below). Given the sign change,
the number of groups will be G ≤ 2k. The weights of links and non-links can be
approximated by the number of links versus non-links in the original network. Since
the graph density is only about 0.03, we set Ω3 = Ω4 = 0. Furthermore, we do not
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need to differentiate the weight of each single link as it is already contained in the
respective values of the link profile Fˆ, hence Ω1 = Ω2 = 1. Notice, however, that
in contrast to Eˆ the link profile Fˆ is not a binary matrix (it contains the relative
weights of links), therefore we lastly introduce a matrix Θ that translates Fˆ into a
binary form such that Θjg = 1 if Fˆjg > 0 and zero otherwise:
Sig =
c∑
j=1
Θjg(FˆjgBji)
2 −
c∑
j=1
(Θjg − 1)(FˆjgBji)2 (3.5)
for all i = 1, . . . , c and g = 1, . . . , G. Thus Θ ensures that we sum over all positive
entries in Fˆ in the first sum, and over all negative entries in the second sum. For
every correct match, that means if a firm i has a link to company j where the link
profile would suggest one, we increase the score that firm i obtains for group g by
the squared entry in the link profile. Symmetrically, if the firm has a link where we
do not expect one, we deduct this score. Each firm is now assigned to the group for
which it has the highest score (by identifying the maxima in each row of S). There
are, of course, quite a few firms that score rather poorly in all of the groups, simply
because they do not belong to any. These firms either have very few links to begin
with, or have a unique link pattern. To filter out such firms, we set a threshold in
our scoring procedure, yet it turns out that the grouping is quite robust with respect
to the exact value of this threshold.13
A critical point in any PCA analysis concerns the question how many components
k to include in the first place. In our context, we find it instructive to check how
many components will create groups containing at least three firms, representing a
rather conservative criterion for defining a group. Our algorithm iteratively increases
the number of principal components and stops when the last included component no
longer produces an additional group. It turns out that only a fraction of the firms
can be mapped to groups, with the greatest eigenvalues accounting for roughly
10 percent of total variance, and the smallest relevant eigenvalues accounting for
roughly 3 percent of total variance. We never include more than the five largest
eigenvalues to create significant groups, that is to say that the inclusion of more
than the largest five eigenvalues leads to groups of size smaller than three. Figure
13 If the best score of a firm is not greater than the mean plus half a standard deviation of scores
within a group, we do not match the firm to the group. The exact tuning of this threshold is of
course arbitrary: choosing a much larger threshold level leads to smaller but more homogeneous
groups (some firms might not be matched at all because of a single differing link), while a much
lower threshold will inflate groups by matching peripheral firms that only show marginal similarity
in the link pattern. Since neither group turns out to be large compared to the entire set of firms,
our quantile-approach is quite robust, and the exact value of the threshold is not crucial for the
overall results. In larger datasets, this parameter could certainly be endogenized.
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3.7 shows the resorted adjacency matrices for 1993, 1999, and 2005, where we plot
cliques with descending size from left to right, followed by firms that do not exhibit
specific connection patterns.14
In 1993 it is still possible to divide the core of our network into overlapping
subgroups, but this structure seems to be fading away over time. The number
of firms that belong to a clique is about 30 in 1993, yet this number as well as
the size of identified cliques is shrinking over time. There is, however, a number
of mega-cap corporations that persistently show up in one of the big cliques: Al-
lianz, Bayer, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Hochtief, Linde, Lufthansa, Siemens,
Thyssen Krupp, and Volkswagen (see Appendix C.4 for details). This visualization
confirms our earlier findings that even if the overall level of connectedness in the
corporate network is decreasing, highly central firms tend to remain central in the
network.
3.5 Discussion
We have argued that Germany’s corporate network exhibits a pronounced core struc-
ture that persists over time in spite of changes in corporate governance, and substan-
tial churning and entry-and-exit dynamics among corporate directors. A remaining
issue concerns the validity of our findings beyond Germany’s one hundred largest
publicly traded companies. So can we reasonably expect our results to be representa-
tive of the entire German corporate network? Judging from the more recent results
by Milakovic´ et al. (2010) for a single year, there is reason for optimism. Considering
the largest 284 German companies in 2008 (accounting for more than 95% of that
year’s market capitalization of Germany’s stock exchange Deutsche Bo¨rse), they ob-
serve very similar magnitudes in the maximum number of board memberships, and
in the density and average centrality of successive b-cores. Second, and more impor-
tantly from the viewpoint of the present study, they find that the pronounced core
structure in Germany’s corporate network is clearly formed by mega-cap companies,
thereby justifying our focus on the one hundred largest companies here. Since they
examine the corporate network in a single year, however, they lack information on
the time evolution of the network.
As our results illustrate, it is exactly the largest three to four dozen mega-cap
corporations that are responsible not only for the existence but also the persistence
of a core over time. While the presence and persistence of a core originate from
the appointment decisions of the very largest German corporations, our findings
14 The source code of the algorithm can be found in Appendix C.1.
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leave little room for the relevance of individual directors from a macroscopic point
of view: the churning and entry-and-exit dynamics of individual directors in our
sample instead emphasize the (seemingly exclusive) importance of the number of
mega-cap board appointments that a director has managed to accumulate at a given
point in time.
If policymakers were to aim for a reduction of pressure group influence, these
types of questions would be crucial for the corresponding policy design, particularly
in light of the fact that existing legal restrictions on the number of simultaneous
board appointments and the maximum term of service before potential reappoint-
ment are obviously not sufficient to decrease the influence of the core network, much
less prevent its existence.
To be clear, the main contribution of this paper is certainly of a descriptive
nature. We have not performed any confirmatory statistical exercises in the tra-
ditional sense, so there is very little (if anything) we can say here about how or
whether a corporate core influences the destinies of individual firms over time, but
these are questions that could surely be addressed in future research. Nevertheless,
we would like to believe that the existence and persistence of a core is interesting
in its own right, and goes well beyond concerns regarding pressure group influence,
particularly in light of the systemic implications already mentioned at the end of
the introduction: the system-wide coordination of opinions, expectations, or even
animal spirits is enormously facilitated by the existence of a network core, and could
very well make a system more fragile exactly because of that. Think, for instance,
of the large-scale coordination of trading positions in financial markets that precede
every financial crisis. From our perspective, it is rather noteworthy that financial
markets also exhibit a core network structure, at least in the few instances for which
data have been available so far (see, e.g., Sorama¨ki et al., 2007).
4. EVOLVEMENT OF UNIFORMITY AND VOLATILITY IN
THE STRESSED GLOBAL FINANCIAL VILLAGE
This is a reprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published as: Kenett D.Y.,
Raddant M., Lux T., Ben-Jacob E. (2012) Evolvement of Uniformity and Volatility in the Stressed
Global Financial Village. PLoS ONE 7(2): e31144.
4.1 Introduction to Stock Market Correlations
Has the world become one small financial global village? Coupling between the
world’s different markets has become stronger and stronger over the past years, as is
evidenced by the financial difficulties, which are affecting many markets around the
globe, especially since late 2008. The growing financial integration allows capital
to flow rather freely between countries and markets. Investments in stocks can be
diversified into global portfolios, consisting of multiple assets from a large number
of markets. As a result, stock markets have turned into an extended and strongly
coupled complex system, in which large movements in price and volatility are likely
to be transferred from one market to the other due to portfolio readjustments. Engle
et al. (1990) have shown that volatility clusters are likely to occur jointly in different
markets. This fact and other evidence of the interdependencies between the world’s
economies emphasize the need to understand the coupling and integration of stock
markets around the world. As the financial crisis of 2008 was not even considered a
possibility by the leading economic theories (see, e.g., Lux and Westerhoff, 2009), it
is necessary to rethink and reformulate the understanding and quantification of the
coupling between different markets.
When it comes to the analysis of individual markets, a wealth of different mea-
sures have been devised and used to analyze similarity between financial time series.
These include Pearson’s correlations (see Kenett et al., 2011,0; Mantegna and Stan-
ley, 2000; Shapira et al., 2009), co-movement measures like in Harmon et al. (2011),
recurrence patterns (see Goswami et al., 2011), and regime switching approaches
(see, e.g., Preis et al., 2011; Preis and Stanley, 2010). There are also studies of the
co-movement of different stock markets. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have shown
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that a high level of dependence is visible between most markets and that changes in
correlation are coupled to volatility changes. However, there are mixed results about
the driving forces of the amount of co-movement and of financial integration. While
King et al. (1994) did not clearly identify the reasons for changes in the correlation,
Beile and Candelon (2011) found evidence that increased trade and financial liber-
alization go hand in hand with a synchronization of stock markets. Furthermore,
Ahlgren and Antell (2010) found that markets are linked closer in times of crisis
which significantly hampers the possibility to diversify investments and thus risks.
Additional studies looked at correlation structures in particular markets, like Tum-
minello et al. (2005), or at the correlation between the indices of different markets
(see, e.g., Song et al., 2011).
Recently, Kenett et al. (2011) investigated the dynamics of correlations between
stocks belonging to the S&P 500 index, and the residual (partial) correlations after
removing the influence of the index . To this end, the Index Cohesive Force (ICF),
which is the ratio between the average stock correlation, and average stock partial
correlation, was introduced. Studying the dynamics of these quantitative measures,
a transition in the dynamics of the U.S. market at the end of 2001 was observed.
Here we expand these previous analyses to the investigation of other markets. We
further extend the scope of the analysis by studying the markets intra and inter
correlations. First, we study correlation structures on the level of single markets, the
market intra-correlation. Next, we study the correlation between different market
pairs, according to three measures - the market index correlation, market meta-
correlation, and market ICF correlation.
4.2 Methods
The similarity between stock price changes is commonly calculated via the Pearson’s
correlation coefficient. The raw stock correlations (see Mantegna and Stanley, 2000)
are calculated for time series of the log of the daily return, given by:
ri(t) = log[Pi(t)]− log[Pi(t− 1)], (4.1)
where Pi(t) is the daily adjusted closing price of stock i at day t. The raw stock
correlations are calculated using Pearson’s correlation coefficient between every pair
of stocks i and j, where
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Fig. 4.1: Normalized stock price indices
Normalized stock price indices; S&P 500 (U.S.), FTSE 350 (U.K.), DAX 30 Performance
(Germany), NIKKEI 500 (Japan), BSE 100 (India), and SSE Composite (China). All
indices have been normalized by their mean. The indices of the U.S., U.K. and Germany
(blue, green and red line) appear almost as if they are shifted parallel, which is a sign of
their high correlation. Note that all price indices are based on stock prices in local currency.
C(i, j) =
〈(ri − 〈ri〉)(rj − 〈rj〉)〉
σiσj
, (4.2)
〈〉 denotes average, and σi are the standard deviations (STD).
Partial correlation is a powerful tool to investigate how the correlation between
two stocks depends on the correlation of each of the stocks with a third mediating
stock or with the index as is considered here. The residual, or partial, correlation
between stocks i and j, using the index (m) as the mediating variable is defined by,
see Shapira et al. (2009); Kenett et al. (2009); Baba et al. (2004).
ρ(i, j|m) = C(i, j)− C(i,m)C(j,m)√
(1− C2(i,m))(1− C2(j,m)) . (4.3)
Note that according to this definition, ρ(i, j|m) can be viewed as the residual corre-
lation between stocks i and j, after subtraction of the contribution of the correlation
between each of the stocks with the index.
To investigate the dynamics of correlations in capital markets, we make use of a
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running window analysis. We use a short time window, of 22-trading days, which
is equivalent to one work month, with a full overlap. Thus, for example the first
window will be days 1-22, the second window day 2-23, etc. At each window we
calculate stock correlation and partial correlation matrices, and average them. This
results in a value of correlation (partial correlation) for each stock, representing its
average correlation (partial correlation) to all other stocks. This is defined as
C(i) =
1
N − 1
N∑
j 6=i
C(i, j) (4.4)
PC(i) =
1
N − 1
N∑
j 6=i
ρ(i, j|m). (4.5)
Finally, we calculate the average of average correlations (partial correlations),
which represents the total average correlation (partial correlation) in the market,
Cintra =
1
N
N∑
i=1
C(i) (4.6)
PCintra =
1
N
N∑
i=1
PC(i). (4.7)
We denote this variable as the intra-correlation (intra partial correlation), as it
represents the average correlation of stocks belonging to one given market.
Next, we investigate the synchronization of two given markets. To this end, we
calculate correlation and lagged cross correlation between the intra correlations of
each market. The correlation of market correlations is denoted as market meta-
correlation (MC), given by
MC(d) =
∑N−d
t=1 (Ci(t)−〈Ci〉)(Cj(t)−〈Cj〉)√∑N−d
t=1 (Ci(t)−〈Ci〉)2
√∑N−d
t=1 (Cj(t)−〈Cj〉)2
(4.8)
d = 0,±1,±2, ...,±N − 1, (4.9)
where d is the lag.
Shapira et al. (2009) and Kenett et al. (2011) have shown that the market index
has a cohesive effect on the dynamics of the stock correlations. This refers to the
observed effect the index has on stock correlations, where we have found that larger
changes of the index result in higher stock correlations, and as such more cohesive
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force. The Index Cohesive Force is defined as ICF (τ) – calculated over a time
window τ , as a measure of the balance between the raw and residual correlations
given by,
ICF (τ) =
〈C(i, j)〉τ
〈ρ(i, j|m)〉τ
=
Cintraτ
PCintraτ
, (4.10)
where τ is the time window, during which the average correlation and average resid-
ual correlation are calculated. 〈C(i, j)〉τ and (〈ρ(i, j|m)〉τ ) are the mean of average
correlation and average partial correlation.
4.3 Data
For the analysis reported in this paper we use data of the daily adjusted closing
price from stocks in six different markets, all downloaded from Thomson Reuters
Datastream. The markets investigated are the U.S., U.K., Germany, Japan, India
and China. These include the four main stock markets as well as two less developed
markets for comparison of the results. For each market we aimed for a sample as
broad as possible, without any ex ante selection of branches. See Table 4.1 for details
on the used stocks. The number of stocks finally used in our analysis shrinks down
significantly, because we only consider stocks that are active from January 2000 until
December 2010. Volume data was used to identify and eliminate illiquid stocks from
the sample. Here, this corresponded to filtering for stocks which had no movement
in the price for more than 6 percent of the 2700 trading days.
Market Stocks used Index used # before # filtered
U.S. S&P 500 S&P 500 500 403
U.K. FTSE 350 FTSE 350 356 116
Germany DAX Composite DAX 30 Performance 605 89
Japan Nikkei 500 Nikkei 500 500 315
India BSE 200 BSE 100 193 126
China SSE Composite SSE Composite 1204 69
Tab. 4.1: Sample statistics for stock data
It should be noted that the correlations measured have some explanatory limita-
tions, which are mainly due to structural differences of the markets and to selection
issues of the stocks. First of all, the dataset is by construction biased towards long-
lived stocks. Secondly, the intra-market correlations have been calculated on the
basis of a market index, which composition is undergoing changes over time. How-
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ever, we are pretty certain that the exact composition of the index used for the
normalization does not have significant influence on the results.
When we compare time series from different markets, some adjustments must be
made, mostly due to differences in trading days. To this end, we either only used data
from days in which trading was done in both markets, or we replaced missing data
with that of the observation of the last trading day. These two methods yield very
similar results for the correlation analysis. When comparing all markets together, we
used the joint trading period of the London (U.K.) and Frankfurt (Germany) stock
exchange (the bilateral pair which has the most overlap with all other markets) and
again replaced missing observations for all other markets with last day observation.
For comparisons of the U.S. and Japan one should be aware that it makes sense to
consider observations of day t for the U.S. and t + 1 for Japan (the date barrier is
in the Pacific), since these observations are closer to each other in terms of trading
hours. Similar considerations can be taken for China and India, although the effect
here is much weaker. In general the calculated correlations might also be influenced
by the amount of overlap in daily trading hours, the amount of overlap in trading
days, and general economic differences (as mentioned in the discussion). Also, the
results depend on the time scale. Here we are interested in the medium run (a few
weeks). A different kind of analysis of short-run effects, including a more detailed
look on volatility, could be done with high-frequency (tick) data.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Dynamics of the Individual Markets
A first proxy to the dynamics of the different world’s economies is the dynamics of
their leading market indices. Here we focus on six of the world’s largest economies,
representing western markets – U.S., U.K., and Germany – and eastern markets -
Japan, India and China. The stock price indices of these countries are presented in
Figure 4.1, showing mostly very similar dynamics.
Investigating the index volatility, rather than the index price reveals meaningful
hidden information. Studying Figure 4.2, a similarity is observed between the three
‘western’ markets, while the volatility peaks of the ‘eastern’ markets only coincide
for some time periods. Thus, it is reasonable to ask whether such uniformity between
some markets, and multiformity between others, can be quantified.
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Fig. 4.2: Relative volatility in different markets
Relative volatility in the markets within a 22-day window. The price indices data was
standardized for the 10-year interval (the mean is zero and the variance is 1 for each
complete time series). The volatility peaks for the U.S, U.K. and Germany mostly coincide
while there is less similarity with Japan. India and China show a very different behavior
of volatility, especially until 2007.
4.4.2 Dynamics of Market Intra-Correlations
To understand the dynamics of capital markets, much research has focused on the
analysis of correlations (see Mantegna and Stanley, 2000; Gopikrishnan et al., 2001;
Aste et al., 2010; Plerou et al., 2000). It is standard practice to calculate the correla-
tions between stocks in a given market, and we correspondingly calculate the corre-
lations between the time series of the stock daily returns, for each market separately.
To obtain a better understanding of the dynamics of correlations in each market,
a sliding window approach is used to calculate the market intra-correlations, using
a 22-day window. In Figure 4.3 we present the dynamics of the intra-correlations
for each of the six markets (see Figure D.1 in the appendix for the dynamics of the
intra partial correlations for each of the six markets).
For each market, a bursting behavior for the intra-correlations is observed. This
is consistent with previous findings in Shapira et al. (2009). Furthermore, a similarity
in the appearance of intra-correlation bursts is noted for some of the markets as is
elaborated in the next section.
Next, we calculate for each of the markets the Index Cohesive Force (ICF, Figure
4.4). High values of the ICF correspond to a state in which the market index domi-
nates the behavior of the market, thus making it stiff and more prone to systematic
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Fig. 4.3: Dynamics of the intra-correlation
Dynamics of the intra-correlation. For each market, we use a 22-day window, and in each
window calculate the intra-correlation. This results in the dynamics of the intra-correlation
for the period of 2000–2010, for each market separately. Each horizontal line represents
the average correlation of one stock (the left y-axis displays the number of the stock). The
western markets and Japan show a similar behavior, visualized through vertical stripes at
the same time, showing synchronized waves of strong correlations. The black line shows
the average of all correlations at a given 22-day window (corresponding to the right y-axis).
The trend is increasing for all countries except for China.
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Fig. 4.4: Dynamics of the ICF
The dynamics of the ICF for each market is plotted for the period of 2000–2010. The
ICF is increasing in the western markets, especially since 2002. In China we observe a
decreasing trend.
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Fig. 4.5: Index correlations and meta-correlations
Index correlations (top) and Meta-correlations (bottom) for the U.S vs. Germany (left)
and Japan (right). Both calculated using a 66-day window. The U.S. and Germany show a
higher similarity for both measures than the U.S. and Japan. While both measures fluctuate
over time, we observe that high correlations do not necessarily show jointly in the top and
the bottom figure. We can thus differentiate between times of identical price movements
(high index correlation) and global stress (high index correlation and high meta-correlation)
failures. By studying Figure 4.4, it is possible to observe that some markets are
similar in their dynamics of the ICF. Some similarities can be observed for the U.S.,
U.K., Germany, and Japan, whereas China shows a significantly different behavior.
The ICF of the U.S. and Japan displays similarity in trend and magnitude, whereas
U.K., India and Germany have a similar trend but much lower magnitude. Finally,
China shows very different behavior than all other markets.
Markets featuring similar values of the ICF will have a similar dependency on
the market index. Thus, if the indices of these markets are highly correlated, these
markets should be strongly coupled. As such, the ICF provides new important
information on these couplings.
4.4.3 Inter-market Correlations in the Global Financial Market
The observed similarities of indices and correlation patters leads to the question of
how synchronized stock markets are with respect to changes in these measures. Thus,
we computed the meta-correlations – the correlations between the intra-correlations,
using a 66-day window. The index correlations, the index volatility correlations and
the ICF correlations were calculated using the same window size.
4. Evolvement of Uniformity and Volatility in the Stressed Global Financial Village 66
According to the index correlations the three ‘western’ markets - U.S., U.K.
and Germany - are highly correlated. The index correlations between Japan and
India and all other markets are significantly weaker (the difference between these
two groups is even more visible for the index volatility). China finally seems rather
uncorrelated with the rest of the world, although some upward trend is visible (see
a year by year breakdown for the market pair correlations in Appendix D.2). How-
ever, index correlations capture only partially the inter relations between different
markets.
The introduction of the Index Cohesive Force makes things easier when one is
considering the dynamics of a particular market and especially if one is interested in
its stability, and provides a valuable measure to assess the state of each individual
market. Previous work has shown that in the case of the U.S. market, low values
of the ICF (lower than 10) correspond to a relatively healthy state of the market.
Specifically, it was found for the U.S. market that the ICF was close to zero, whereas
in 2008 it was approaching 60. To further illustrate this point, we have found
that the distribution of the ICF values change during times of economic stress,
displaying much fatter tails (see for example for the Japanese market in Appendix
D.3). However, the ICF has been found to be highly fluctuating, and thus the ICF
correlations between markets do not provide a reliable measure of the market inter
relations.
Much better results are obtained using the meta-correlations. Using this mea-
sure, we found that the three ‘western’ markets have a high level of uniformity. The
Japanese market appears to be significantly more influenced by the ‘west’ than the
Indian market, the Chinese has the lowest correlations. The latter is in line with
what was expected for example given the capital controls and regulations in China
and limitations for foreign investors, see also Chen et al. (2010). Using a cross-
correlation analysis, it is possible to further investigate the level of synchronization
between the different markets. Typically, the lag (the time delay for maximum cross
correlation) is 0 for high correlations and it fluctuates for low correlations (see Fig-
ure 4.5 for the correlations of the U.S., Germany and Japan, and the Figures in
Appendix D.4 for the meta and index correlations for all markets, see Appendix D.5
for an alternative visualization for the U.S. market only). Generally speaking, we
observe that the magnitude of inter market correlations fluctuates similarly like the
magnitude of the intra-market correlations of the different market pairs.
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Fig. 4.6: The global financial village
The global financial village for the years 2000 (left) and 2010 (right). The width of the edges
of the graph is proportional to the meta-correlation between the markets it connects (right
legend). The node size is proportional to the inter-correlations (left legend). For 2000 we
observe markets with low intra-correlations and inter-correlations of similar magnitude,
excluding China. For 2010 we observe much higher intra-correlations in all markets and
a denser network of interdependencies. (The nodes for the U.K. and Germany are further
away from each other than their geographical position)
4.4.4 Dynamics of the Global Financial Village
The coupling of markets, as quantified by the meta-correlation, changes over time.
The Japanese market switches between following the ‘western’ and following the
‘eastern’ worlds: for some time intervals it behaves very similar to the U.S. mar-
ket (which is also similar to the U.K. and Germany markets), and at other times,
the intra-correlations of Japan behave more similar to that of the Asian countries.
Similar observations can be made for U.K. and Germany and their similarity to the
U.S. vs. Asia. The interdependencies between India and China and the more devel-
oped markets are very volatile over time and show maxima in years with important
global events (2001: 9/11-attacks, 2003: Iraq war, SARS, etc.). To illustrate the
general development, we show the differences in coupling between markets during
2001 and 2010 (see Figure 4.6). The line strength is proportional to the level of the
meta-correlations. The world’s financial markets show a higher uniformity in the
later years of our analysis.1
4.5 Discussion
This paper presents a new framework for quantitative assessments of the coupling
and interdependences between different markets in the global financial village. The
1 A video visualizing the development of market interdependencies is available online:
http://dl.dropbox.com/u/16978699/globalmarket.mp4
4. Evolvement of Uniformity and Volatility in the Stressed Global Financial Village 68
new approach also provides the means to study feedback between the micro (intra
market) and the macro (inter markets) levels. More specifically, the stock-stock
correlations in the individual markets represent local market dynamics, whereas
the meta-correlations represent global market dynamics. Thus, the methodology
presented here of intra and meta correlation analysis provides the means to study
the bottom-top and top-down feedback mechanisms which take place in the world’s
economies.
Our results provide new information about the uniformity preset in the world’s
economies. We find significant uniformity for the three western markets, whereas
Japan and India display a greater extent of multiformity; however, this multiformity
is time dependent, and periods of significant uniformity with the western markets
are observed. Unlike these, the case of China is significantly different. For all
our measures it shows an amount of segmentation that is not in line with China’s
important role in the world economy, especially the huge trade flows we observe.
Earlier studies hint that the sole legal possibility to invest in emerging mar-
kets is not sufficient for their full integration with other markets. Investment funds
and other institutional investors need accompanying financial products (i.e. country
funds, depository receipts, and other derivatives), which are only gradually becom-
ing available in emerging markets. Country specific risks, taxes and holding time
requirements can further dampen cross-border investments (see Carrieri et al., 2007;
Bekaert and Campbell, 1995). In China, significant parts of the economy are still
state-owned. Furthermore, the Chinese stock market is differentiated into one for
foreign investors and one for domestic investors. The amount of share holdings
for private and foreign investors is still subject to substantial governmental restric-
tions (see, e.g., Zhu and Pan, 2011). These restrictions are obviously an effective
and significant measure to deter foreign investors, and cause a partial de-coupling
from other markets. Nevertheless, the methods presented here provide the means to
quantify functional differences between developed and emerging markets. Further
research is required to expand on this, especially by means of studying many more
developed and emerging markets, and their coupling and interdependencies.
Finally, some interesting observations can be made about the general develop-
ment of financial markets. It has been much debated that markets have become
more coupled over the last years, and that we are observing the downside of this
development right now during the debt crisis within the Eurozone and the U.S.,
expressed in pronounced synchronized movements of stock markets. From our anal-
ysis it becomes evident that this uniformity does not only stem from an increase of
correlation between markets, but that there has also been an ongoing simultaneous
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shift towards uniformity in each single market.
In conclusion, using new specially devised analysis methods, we provide the
means to investigate and quantify uniformity and multiformity in the global market,
and changes in these measures. In the current era, when the global financial village
is highly prone to systemic collapses which can sweep the entire village, our approach
can provide a sensitive “financial seismograph” to detect early signs of global crises.
5. STRUCTURE IN THE ITALIAN OVERNIGHT LOAN
MARKET
5.1 Introduction to Bank Networks
In this chapter we investigate the lending behavior of banks in the Italian overnight
loan market. Unlike in most other European countries in Italy, most of the overnight
loans are settled by a central trading platform called E-mid. For our analysis we
use tick data from this platform from the period 1999–2010. Although loans with
different maturities are dealt over this system we focus on overnight loans, which
are by far the biggest part of all transactions.
Since the 2008 financial crisis the overall interest in the linkages between banks
has risen. Only little research was carried out before, some European markets have
been analyzed for example by Iori et al. (2008), Boss et al. (2006), Furfine (2003),
Hartmann et al. (2001) and Cocco et al. (2009). The U.S. money market system,
Fed-wire, has been analyzed for example by Ashcraft and Duffie (2007).
The risen interest in these markets is twofold. On the one hand it stems from the
observation of the partly collapse of interbank markets itself, the other reason is the
increasing need for risk assessment in the bank network in general. The contagious
effects that played a big role in the events after the Lehman default1 showed that
a micro-prudential analysis of banks’ exposures does not capture the systemic risks
that the default of a bank can have.
Banks are of course connected through many different financial products, the
analysis of overnight loans which we perform here is thus only a first step in under-
standing the networks of banks.
Until 2008 all bigger banks could relatively easy manage their short and medium
run liquidity with various trading partners in different interbank markets. Since
then the behavior of banks in the interbank market has changed dramatically. The
volume in the interbank markets has fallen sharply, see, e.g., Gabrieli (2009) for
1 The U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers Inc. defaulted on 15th September 2008, marking
the highpoint of the subprime mortgage crisis. It was followed by a sharp drop of all major stock
price indices and financial market distress that necessitated massive bailout programs for banks
around the world.
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Fig. 5.1: Interest rates in the E-mid market
The plot shows the daily mean rate in the black and every individual trade as a red dot.
Cyclical peaks are visible at each end of the month. Overall most of the average rates are
very close to the EURIBOR rate.
the E-mid case, instead of a rise of spreads that would compensate for grown credit
risks, we observed a shift from interbank market funding to funding by central banks.
Very recent studies nevertheless show that interbank markets are still important, but
that the trading activity has changed noticeably. These studies include Afonso et al.
(2011) and Bech et al. (2011) for the Federal Funds market and Angelini et al. (2009)
for the Italian market.
The earlier studies on the Italian market have already shed light on a number
of statical regularities of trading behavior in the market. Also, we know that no
pronounced clusters exit in the Italian market when conditional trading volume is
analyzed, see Fricke and Lux (2012). The structure of the market can at best be
described as a core-periphery structure, similar to the findings by Craig and von
Peter (2010) for the German market.
Relatively little interest has been devoted to the analysis of interest rates from
individual contracts. Hence, this paper will try to add some insights into the struc-
ture of this market by looking for preferential lending relationships between banks.
Further we will look at how lending conditions and trading volumes developed over
time and in which respect the market of today differs from the market as it was
before the financial crisis. However, as a starting point we will have a look at the
more general statistical patterns of trading activity.
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Fig. 5.2: Regularities in trading behavior and rates during the day and month
Top left: the trading activity shows a slight increase at the end of the month, Bottom left:
the standard deviation of the average daily rate (red) is increasing at the end of the month,
Top right: trading activity shows regular maxima in the morning and afternoon, Bottom
right: the deviations from the average daily rate become negative during the day, as shown
by the linear fit of the red line.
5.2 Regularities in Trade Behavior
Figure 5.1 gives a first overview of the rates that are paid in the market. The
average volume weighted daily mean is given by the solid black line. It follows
very closely the EURIBOR rate. Periodic peaks occur on and before every 24th of
each month, when the banks balance their positions and report to the supervisor.
Each single trade is marked by a red dot, the resulting red area shows the effective
range of interest rates being paid. Almost all observations are within the band of
the European Central Bank’s deposit facility and marginal lending facility rate (for
example for the period from June 2003 until December 2005 these rates were at 1%
and 3%).
The daily and monthly patters of trading behavior are shown in Figure 5.2.
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Within the month we observe a slight increase in trading volume when we approach
the 24th. The top left plot shows the number of trades for the days preceding the
24th with descending distance. The bottom left plot shows the dynamics of rate
volatility. For comparable results we calculate the difference of each trade’s rate
from the average weighted daily mean and plot rates for the separate days. The red
line indicates the standard deviation for each day. We observe the highest volatility
of loan rates at the end of the month.
The daily trading patterns are very regular and are summarized by the top right
plot. Pronounced peaks of trading activity are visible around 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. and
a smaller one at 12:30 p.m., these can be explained first by office hours and secondly
by the regular liquidity in and outflow that stems from the settlement of last day’s
E-mid trades and settlement from other trading platforms including the cash leg of
securities. In general we can confirm the results of Iori et al. (2008).
At last we can look at the development of the average rates during the day.
The right bottom panel shows a scatter plot, the average rate is slightly decreasing
towards the end of the day, just as the maturity of any initiated contract is effectively
decreasing by a few hours.2 For a detailed analysis of the intraday development of
loan rates see Baglioni and Monticini (2008).
5.3 Volatility and Trade Flows
An inspection of the interest rates over time reveals that trading behavior has
changed significantly over the last years. Figure 5.3 shows a massive increase of
volatility in September 2008 after a transition period that starts in early 2007. For
this reason we start with looking at the market for the period from 1999 until 2006,
to see how the market is organized in “normal” times and turn to an analysis of the
dynamics until 2010 in Section 5.5
As a starting point we have a look at the number of trades and trade volumes
for all market participants. We can plot the relationships between all banks as color
coded values in a adjacency matrix. Every row in the plots in Figure 5.4 symbolizes
one bank i and the entries in the columns give us information about the trades with
every other bank j. The rows and columns in all plots are ordered first by nationality
of the banks (first foreign banks, then Italian banks) and second by trade volume in
ascending order. By definition an entry in row i column j can be interpreted as a
relationship where bank i is the borrower in a contract with bank j.
2 For better visibility the two bottom scatter plots only show a random subsample of the dataset.
3 The UK bank Northern Rock was faced with severe liquidity problems in September 2007
which finally lead to the bank becoming state owned to prevent a possible default.
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Fig. 5.3: Interest rates and volatility over time
The top panel shows the difference from the mean daily rate for all trades. The bottom
panel shows the daily volatility of loan rates. While for the period until early 2007 there are
no permanent volatility increases, we see a change in late 2007, when with the Northern
Rock bank run3 volatility increases slightly, before in late 2008 we observe a drastic change
in the market.
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Fig. 5.4: Trade flows, volume and net volume, 1999–2006
Top left: Number of trades, Top right: aggregate volume, identical values for the color
coding of number of trades and volume in millions of Euro, Bottom left: Net volume,
Bottom right: Net volume for preferential lending relationships from the estimation in
Section 5.4. The rows and column are ordered: first into foreign and Italian banks, then
by total trade volume. Row entries are borrowing transactions, column entries resemble
lending. The plots show the asymmetry in lending, the banks with the highest trade volume
are large net borrowers.
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From the two top panels we can infer two regularities of the market. First of
all, the foreign banks are much more visible in the right plot of aggregate trade
volume than in the left plot showing the number of trades. The explanation is that
the average volume per trade for foreign banks is significantly larger than for Italian
banks. Obviously only larger foreign banks take part in the E-mid market. Secondly,
the volume plot is far from symmetric. For the large banks at the bottom of the plot
we observe pronounced borrowing activity which is not offset by an equal amount
of lending, that should show as dark entries in the rightmost columns. To clarify
this issue, the bottom left plot shows the net amounts that result from all trades.
This plot is symmetric by construction. We observe that the banks with the largest
trading volume are mostly net borrowers in the market.
The loan transactions that we have just seen expressed by a plot of the adjacency
matrices can of course be interpreted as a network between the banks in this market.
Two problems arise when one wants to map these relationships into a meaningful
graph. For very short periods of time aggregation the resulting networks are very
volatile and show a high level of randomness. Since thousands of transactions take
place on a single day, the aggregation of trades over a longer time span will result
in network representations where every bank with some activity will be connected
to a very large share of the market participants. From the economic view point
there is nothing wrong with this finding. It shows that the market is efficient in
the sense that excess liquidity is distributed in the absence of noticeable market
segmentations.
A resulting network representation is shown in Figure 5.5. To get an impression
of the most important ties in the lending network from 1999–2006 we only consider
links that correspond to a minimum of 250 borrowing transactions. As a result we
see the strongly connected cluster of (mostly) Italian banks. Some hubs are visible
in the core of this network, most of them are characterized by a high in-degree,
which reflects the lending asymmetries discussed above.4
4 The visualizations of the networks was performed using the software Pajek and the algorithm
by Kamada and Kawai (1989) which produced a planar representation of the graph by minimizing
the length of the edges.
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5.4 Estimation of Credit Spreads and Preferential Lending
Relationships
5.4.1 What Loan Rates Can Tell
The relatively large dataset with about 1.3 million observations allows us not only
to investigate trading patters, we can of course also investigate if banks trade at loan
rates that differ significantly from the mean. For the years until 2006 the spreads
for overnight loans cannot be expected to be very large since the counterpart risks
for a one day loan are rather meaningless. Nevertheless, the range of banks that
trade in the market is large, we have some global players but also some very small
institutions, hence, some difference in risk should be priced in at least in a long run
average.
In case that banks trade with each other very often, we can also analyze if the
trading for this pair results in loan rates that differ from the average, conditional on
the individual spreads and some other control variables. Significant deviations for
pairs of trading partners can then be interpreted as a situation where preferential
lending takes place between couples of banks. This analysis of “friendly” relation-
ships could help to distinguish “random” trading relationships from those where
institutional or personal ties play a role.
5.4.2 Estimation
The varying volatility in the market is of course a problem for the estimation, thus,
similar to Cocco et al. (2009) we use the daily volatility to normalize the basis point
interest rate differences that is our dependent variable. The remaining intraday
volatility fluctuations are rather unsystematic. To obtain values that can be inter-
preted similar as interest rates we multiplied the standardized rate differences by
the average of daily volatilities. The resulting variable is bpd. Further we discard
the observations from the last day of each month and single days with an extremely
high volatility, since trading behavior here differs noticeably from “normal” days
and is of no help for our estimation.
As in most high frequency financial data we observe strong dependence. In
contrast to stock markets, where the squared price changes show long lasting au-
tocorrelation as a consequence of long memory in volatility (see, e.g., Engle and
Russell, 2010), our data shows this feature even in the raw price changes. Since
we are only interested in effects that happen on top of some autoregressive process,
we estimate different versions of our model and compare the results to check for
robustness
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In the “simple” model we account for autocorrelation in the data by taking a
weighted average of the last 8 trades, denoted ar to filter for autocorrelation5. We
can then further estimate the bid ask spread in the data, ba, the influence of the
log traded amount am, the influence of trading time tm, and the day, given by the
difference until the end of the month EoM (the last three all as deviations from their
mean values, day and time measured in units of days). For all the roughly 180 banks
with at least 250 loan contracts we can estimate their spread by adding a matrix of
dummy variables B. This matrix then has 180 columns with entries in Bti if bank
i is the borrower in contract t. Similar we can estimate pairwise relationships and
add the dummy matrix Pty(i,j), where P has as many columns y as we have couples
of banks i and j where bank i is borrowing at least 250 times from bank j. This
results in estimating
bpdt = β0 + β1art + β2bat + β3amt + β4tmt + β5EoMt + γBt + ηPt + t (5.1)
In order to get an idea of the influence of the standardization procedure we also
estimate this model with a filtered version of the raw loan rate differences. The
sample here gets smaller, because we filter all trading days where the volatility is
larger than 0.0005, a value that produces a time series where the heteroskedasticity
seems not too bad. Further we estimate the model also without P to make sure the
estimation of bank fixed effects and preferential lending are independent.
The simple model actually works very well for the short run autocorrelation but
for longer horizons some remains visible. In the “extended” model the autoregressive
process is specified in a bit more detail. Similar to the so-called HAR model by Corsi
(2009) we model the autoregressive process with variables that cover different parts
of the lag structure. In addition to the ar term, which reflects the current market
price, we introduce arq and arh which reflect the average price differences from the
last 15 minutes and the proceeding hour of trading. The extended model can be
written down as
bpdt = β0 + β1art + β2ar
q
t + β3ar
h
t + β4bat + β5amt + β6EoMt + γBt + ηPt + t(5.2)
In this model the effect of time tm cannot be estimated since this would conflict
with the long run rate variable arh. When we test this specification of the model and
5 The weights were derived from the coefficients when estimating the model with 8 lags. Hence
the result is the same as estimating the model with 8 separate lag terms, but a weighted average
has shown to be more stable when adding all other variables.
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regress only on the ar variables, we see that it removes the autocorrelation better
than the simple model, not to say perfectly. However, when we add all our dummy
variables we see from the DW statistics that the filtering is acceptable but not as
good. The likely reason for this is that also our dependent variables show some
autocorrelation which might lead to a slight underestimation of ar. This effect can
be dampened by removing trades from the dataset where one bank is the borrower
in successive trades. Essentially this mean that we remove trades that are likely to
result from order splitting.
In general one should keep in mind that the micro-structure of this loan market
differs from, for example, stock markets in two decisive ways. First of all, unlike
stocks, loans are not a perfectly homogeneous good; if a lender wants to make a loan
contract depends on the credit quality of the borrower and possibly on his already
existing exposure to this borrower. Secondly, the market is not anonymous, the
counterparts of a trade know each other, and might negotiate about a trade before
settling it on the E-mid platform (see also Beaupain and Durre´, 2008). This is likely
to lead to a sluggish reaction to price movements. While new prices are quoted
several times within a minute in busy trading periods, the effective time it can take
to negotiate and process a trade is likely to be a bit higher, say, in the order of
minutes.
5.4.3 Results
Table 5.1 shows the OLS estimation results for four versions of the model. A constant
is needed because the volume weighted average daily mean rate differs from the
unweighted average over all trades. The coefficients β1 to β6 are all significant
(mostly on the 99% level) and have the expected sign. The difference of the results
for the models using raw data versus the standardized data are visible but they still
yield comparable results. Since more volatile trading days have been filtered from
the raw data sample the coefficient for the autoregressive term is still a bit larger
than for the standardized data model. The same effect might explain the difference
in the coefficients for time tm. The influence of the day EoM seems to be limited
on the volatility pattern we saw in the previous section, from the table we see that
the influence is very small and the exact result seems to depend on details of the
model specification and the filtration of the dataset.
The estimation results are stable when adding the preferential lending fixed ef-
fects P , none of the other variable changes sign, changes in the coefficients are
negligible, given that we triple the number of variables in this step.
In the extended model most of the split orders, which come predominantly from
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indep. variable raw data std. data std. data ext. model
const .2367 .2162 .2290 .1135
(31.5) (28.3) (30.8) (18.2)
ar .6506 .6698 .6662 .4302
(689.9) (867.2) (882.9) (277.3)
arq .3034
(159.7)
arh .1172
(74.2)
ba .4909 .4686 .4422 .5472
(272.5) (333.3) (313.1) (318.4)
am .0707 .0654 .0498 .0496
(83.1) (97.2) (67.8) (62.3)
tm -.2453 -.1765 -.2239
(-30.7) (-28.2) (-35.7)
EoM -.0015 -.0006 -.0006 .0002
(-15.9) (-8.1) (-8.3) (2.2)
B #172 #189 #189 #176
P # 755 #412
obs. 660,155 949,013 949,013 663,264
DW 1.98 2.00 1.98 1.91
σ2 .3700 .3336 .3166 .2935
R2 .6416 .6408 .6590 .6724
Tab. 5.1: Regression results
Results from the OLS regression. The left column contains the results for the raw data
model, the two center columns results for the standardized data simple model. The results
for the extended model are in the right column. T-values are in parentheses. The number
of variables for the borrower fixed effects B and preferential lending P are shown below.
The estimation results for these variables are summarized in Figure 5.6 and 5.7.
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Fig. 5.6: Implied credit spreads
The histogram shows the implied credit spreads for the period 1999–2006. The reference
point is the EURIBOR rate. The average rate in the Italian market was on average
marginally below the EURIBOR rate, most banks trade within a range of 2 bps.
the larger banks, have been removed. As a consequence the sample contains rela-
tively more trades from small banks, which results in a higher average loan rate.
Due to the lower number of observations fever relationships P can be estimated.
The DW value is slightly worse than for the simple model, because it only accounts
for autocorrelation on lag 1.
To compare the simple and the extended model in a bit more detail we checked
if the estimated fixed effects γ and η are similar. In fact the bank fixed effects are
almost identical, although the sample size for the extended model is much smaller.
The estimation results for preferential lending relationships show some variations,
here the absolute values seem less reliable, but the classification into preferential
versus non-preferential relationships is rather robust. For details see Figure E.1 in
the appendix.
To check for the significance of the results we perform a simple bootstrapping
experiment for both, the bank fixed effects γ and the preferential lending relationship
fixed effects η. This is done by separately re-shuﬄing the dummy matrices B and P
and repeatedly estimating the model with these randomized dummy matrices. An
alternative p-value can than be calculated from the bootstrapped distributions of the
resulting γ and η. The results confirm the p-values calculated from the t-statistics.6
6 For η for example, a coefficient value of .059 marks the 95% confidence interval from the boot-
stapping experiment, while the t-statistics suggest a value of .058 (assuming the same average
variance). Alternatively the dummy variable P can be shifted in time, which conserves the auto-
correlation. In this case the bootstrapped distribution of η becomes slightly assymetric and the
bounds for the 95% interval are -.07 and .06. To summarize, this indicates that the significance of
the estimates are (if at all) most likely only slightly overstated by the regular t-statistics.
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Fig. 5.7: Estimated coefficients for frequent trading relationships
The histogram shows the estimated deviations of the interest rate for trading relationships
with at least 250 trades. The 95% confidence interval is indicated by the dashed line. The
distribution is biased towards negative values which means that the majority of frequent
trading relationships comes with a slightly lower loan rate. Values derived from the extended
model.
The distribution of borrower fixed effects γ, which can be interpreted as credit
spreads are shown in Figure 5.6. Here we show them as the difference from the
EURIBOR rate. Obviously most of the banks borrow within a band of 2 bps, which
is not much. However it is important to account for these effects before we turn to
the pairwise bank relationships, which would otherwise be overshadowed.
The influence of preferential lending finally is shown in Figure 5.7. The distri-
bution of preferential lending effects is biased towards negative values. This is not
totally unexpected, because in this subsample large banks should be overrepresented,
remember that only relationships with a minimum of 250 borrowing transactions are
estimated. We can visualize these preferential lending relationships by looking at its
adjacency matrix. A plot with all relationships where the loan rate was significantly
lower (95% conf. level) than the average is shown in the bottom right panel in Figure
5.4. The plot shows the net volume for these lending relationships (in this plot the
bottom right part of the adjacency matrix is magnified). The most frequent lending
relationships are characterized by one-sided borrowing activity. Significant devia-
tions from the mean loan rate occur only for Italian banks. Preferential lending, as
shown in the plot, happens predominantly when top 30 banks borrow from smaller
Italian banks or from other banks with very high market volume.
We can also show the network of these preferential lending relationships in Fig-
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ure 5.8. The network is dominated by unidirectional links to big hubs, these banks
steadily absorb the excess liquidity from smaller banks, which obviously leads to
some kind of preferential relationships. These relationships expressed by slight dis-
counts in the interest rates are small, so they might not be of big economical im-
portance for the single bank, nevertheless they become visible in our data. Lending
relationships which are presumably of a more random kind are filtered out in this
network representation. Conversely, lending relationships that result in higher then
average loan rates result from lending from more peripheral banks. The resulting
network of these non-preferential lending relationships does not have a dense core
and is much more segmented than the latter network, see Figure E.2 in the appendix.
5.5 Lending Dynamics and Financial Crisis
5.5.1 Development of Credit Spreads and Volume Dynamics
In the following we turn to an analysis of the market dynamics over time and to the
changes that have been induced by the ongoing financial crisis. We start with the
estimation of credit spreads on a year by year basis.7 The plots in Figure 5.9 reveal
that the number of trades (and volume) has a decreasing trend that even accelerates
in 2008. The number of banks for which we can estimate the spread is thus also
decreasing. While the range of spreads, measured by the standard deviation of γ,
are very low until 2007, we see a sharp increase afterwards and a slightly puzzling
dip in 2009.
Since the composition of the sample shows some churning over time we should
also look at the sample of 14 banks which are very active throughout the whole time
in Figure 5.10. The fixed sample confirms our results, while spreads are relatively
low until 2007, 2008 shows a slight amplification. In 2010 we see a much more
differentiated picture. This panel also reveals that 2009 is characterized by an slight
increase in the spreads (relative to EURIBOR) which affects all banks similarly, and
hence leads to a drop in the standard deviation of spreads (see also Figure E.3 in
the appendix). The results for 2009 might also suggest that instead of trading at a
higher rates, banks choose not to trade if all, if possible, and used the central banks
for their refinancing operations (see also Gabrieli (2009) for this issue).
We can also look at how much the positions and trade shares within the network
have changed from year to year. Denote by V[N×N ] the matrix of aggregate trade
volumes between the N banks in our network, then the share of total volume RV tij
7 We use the simple model since this is more efficient for smaller samples and we have seen that
the results for the borrower fixed effects do not differ significantly from the extended model.
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Fig. 5.9: Credit spreads over time
Panel 1: The difference of the average E-mid rate and the EURIBOR rate is rather small,
an increase is visible after 2008. Panel 2: The standard deviation of estimated credit
spreads is increasing in 2010 after noticeable changes in the spreads in 2008 and 2009.
Panel 3: The number of banks with at least 200 trades is decreasing steadily, the process
accelerates in 2008. Panel 4: The number of overnight trades on the E-mid platform is
declining from around 135,000 in 1999 to 45,000 in 2010.
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Fig. 5.10: Credit spreads over time, fixed sample
The panel shows the color codes spreads with the EURIBOR as a reference for the 14 banks
which are constantly trading on E-mid from 1999 until 2010. In 2008 the spreads become
a bit more pronounced, in 2009 we observe an increase of spreads which equally effect all
14 banks. In 2010 spreads are again widening and increasing. We observe a reordered
ranking of the implied ranking of banks.
that bank i borrows from bank j in year t can be expressed as
RV t =
V t∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 V
t
(5.3)
and the change in relative volumes is given by
∆RV t,t−1 =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 |RV t −RV t−1|
2
(5.4)
For ∆RV a value of 0 corresponds to a situation where the volume shares have
been unchanged, the maximum value is 1 and describes in situation where every
bank changed all trading partners.
For the dynamics of the net positions we first have to calculate the net volumes
as NV t = V t − (V t)T . Since we only want to compare the net borrowing for banks
which were trading with each other in two successive years we filter the net volumes
such that we use only those entries from the matrix which were non-zero for both
years, hence NV F,t+1ij = NV
t+1
ij if V
t
ij > 0 and 0 otherwise, conversely for NV
F,t.
Then the relative net volumes are given by
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RNV t =
NV F,t∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 |NV F,t|
(5.5)
and the change in these net volumes can then be calculated as
∆RNV t,t−1 =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 |RNV t −RNV t−1|
2
. (5.6)
This measure is also bound between 0 and 1. Changes in total volume from year
to year do not have a direct effect on these measures, since we treat all quantities
as shares of the annual total amounts.
Finally we can calculate the ratio of net positions to total volume NTV as
NTV t =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 |NV t|
2
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 V
t
, (5.7)
which tells us how much of the lending volume in the market stems from lending
relationships which do not net out within one year.
The top panel of Figure 5.11 shows the volume differences. For most of the time
about one half of the relative volume was shifted to other trading partners from
year to year, the rate is increasing heavily after 2008. The development of relative
net volume changes in the middle panel shows a different behavior. We see a first
dip here in 2002. This coincides with the year when more foreign banks entered the
E-mid market, see Fricke and Lux (2012). We observe a slight increase from then
on until 2008, for 2009 and 2010 we see a slight decline, which is very interesting,
because it does not follow the trend of the volume figures. The ratio of net positions
to total volume in the bottom panel explains most of this effect. While the market
volume in general is shrinking, unidirectional lending is gaining relatively importance
in the market, the ratio of net positions to total volume is increasing to over 90%
after a small dip in 2007.
5.5.2 Lending in the Post-Lehman Market
Finally we can repeat our analysis of trade flows and preferential lending relation-
ships for the post-Lehman period. Figure 5.12 shows the number of trades, volume
and net volume with the color coding similar to Figure 5.4. The number of trades
and volume have experienced a noticeable drop, yet the asymmetric lending pattern
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Fig. 5.11: Volume dynamics
Top panel: The share of relative volumes differences in borrowing relationships varies
between 0.4 and 0.5 until 2008, after then it increases to 0.7; we observe in increasing
change of trading partners. Middle panel: The change in relative net volume differences
is relatively stable at around 0.4. We observe a slight decrease in 2002 when more foreign
banks enter the market and a slight peak from 2007 to 2008. Bottom panel: The ratio of
net positions to total trading volume is increasing to 0.9 after is was between 0.7 and 0.8
until 2008.
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Fig. 5.12: Trade flows, volume and net volume, post-Lehman
Top left: Number of trades, Top right: aggregate volume, Bottom left: Net volume, Bottom
right: non-preferential lending relationships. The rows and columns are ordered: first
into foreign and Italian banks, then by total trade volume. Row entries are borrowing
transactions, column entries represent lending. The trade volume has decreased, some
banks have left the market.
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Fig. 5.13: Distribution of η for the post-Lehman period
The histogram of η shows that for the past Lehman period lending relationships with at
least 80 trades have a bias for rate premia. The threshold is scaled down to account for
the shorter time horizon and the smaller average number of trades.
among the Italian banks is still visible.
We have already discussed the estimation of credit spreads on a year by year basis,
thus we can now directly turn to the estimation of preferential lending relationships
for the entire period of August 2008 – December 2010. The distribution of η, the
coefficients from the estimation of frequent lending relationships is shown in Figure
5.13. For this period the histogram is biased towards positive values, which is in
sharp contrast to the results for the period from 1999 until 2006.
The nature of the transition that took place in the market becomes more clear
when we again plot the adjacency matrix of these relationships. Instead on focusing
on the lending relationships that result in lower rates, we have a look at those which
result in slightly higher rates, the “non-preferential” lending. The bottom right plot
of Figure 5.12 shows that now many of the one-sided borrowing relationships, which
until 2008 lead to slight discounts in the loan rate, trade at a small premium (see
Appendix E.4 for a network representation). The interpretation of this change is
straightforward, the basic pattern of the market is that we have some large banks
with a huge net liquidity (refinancing) demand and large group of relatively smaller
banks with some excess supply. As long as the economic situation was stable and
counterparty risks were negligible, the small banks were reluctant to lend to the big
banks. After 2008 the basic situation of excess demand and supply was the same but
most likely the risk assessment has changed. Lending relationships with a permanent
net position of one of the parties now tendencially lead to slightly increased loan
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rates.
5.6 Discussion
The Italian interbank market has undergone significant changes during the last 12
years. After its start it could attract not only Italian banks but also a number of
foreign banks joined the market. Some smaller banks have left the market, this
might be a result of merges and acquisitions activity, some of them might also have
transfered the refinancing and liquidity management to larger affiliated banks.
The trading volume in the market went down significantly, especially since inter-
bank markets became stressed in 2008. A noticeable change is that we can observe
economically significant spreads in the market since 2010. After Angelini et al.
(2009) have already observed a widening of spread for loans with a longer maturity,
this could be a signal for a changing risk assessment of banks also in the overnight
market. One could draw the conclusion that until 2007 banks would be willing to
lend to anyone on the overnight market with some reputation and that in 2008, when
a day-to-day monitoring of the counterparts became necessary, because there was
suddenly a much higher risk of default, they were not capable of this monitoring, or
it was too costly.
A changing behavior is also observed for the very frequent trading relationships.
While we see slight discounts from these relationships until 2006, the reverse happens
from 2008 until 2010. The net exposure to a borrower is now something that is
associated with an additional risk that is priced into the loan rate, additional to the
overall borrower specific spread.
Methodologically we have seen that it is possible to combine approaches from
network science, like the analysis of flows and network structure, with approaches
from empirical economics, the analysis of interest rates, in a complementary way.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis deals with topics which – at least superficially – are rather diverse. The
overarching element is that an analysis of dependencies and thus of network structure
was applied for all of them. In Chapter 2 we have seen network structures which
represent different levels of influence of market participants. Such systems, in which
a large number of agents are involved, but only a factually much smaller core of
agents drive the outcome of a system, are clearly opposed to conventional economic
models where agents are indistinguishable.
One might argue that in this model reasonable features that can stabilize markets
and dampen volatility are blinded out. The reason for this is that we want to focus
on the interaction effects that arise from these structures, since it has already been
shown in the literature that herding effects will also happen if a reasonable number
of rational agents or ‘fundamentalist’ are present.
As a result we have seen that the hierarchical pattern that we introduced has
significant influence on the volatility of the opinion index in this herding model. This
was most pressing in the scenario where both, the degree distribution of the network,
and the distribution of the weights of the top-level agents, followed a power law.
From the modeling point of view this might seem very stylized, but in fact, social,
economic, and political systems often show settings where influence and connectivity
is concentrated on smaller sub-groups. This can happen through delegation, vote,
or just as consequence of economies of scale and efficiency. A logical step in further
research would be to show, how these structures arise endogenously in such a model.
In Chapter 3 we have shown the development of a real network over time. The
network of German corporate boards is at least one small example for a system where
we can clearly identify a group of agents, in this case real managers, who are far
more connected and very likely more influential than others. We have argued that
despite a certain decrease in overall connectivity, structural patterns of the network
are maintained over time. While certain properties of the degree distribution might
be persistent by construction, it would be hard to explain that distinct links between
companies should show persistence only by chance. The replacement of overly central
managers with other overly central managers hints at some amplification effect.
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While one can argue that this might result from the promotion of very experi-
enced and successful managers to even more prestigious posts, it also means that
connectivity might be self-enforcing. If we evaluate this network structure in the
light of our herding model from the first chapter, we can suppose that the core of
this network could be quite susceptible to collective opinions swings, which might
have economic implication if connectivity goes hand in hand with influence. Unfor-
tunately this hypothesis might never be testable. What is encouraging is the fact
that the number of studies on similar networks has increased (see, e.g., Vitali et al.,
2011), which is likely to lead to a better understanding of the map of the real econ-
omy. In general, as we gain access to more data of complex network structures in
the economy, new opportunities for simulations emerge. This might bring especially
agent-based modelers very close to the forecasting community, and is likely to lead
to more policy related research in this field.
It is not very obvious why the content of Chapter 4 is network science. On a first
glance we deal with time-series data of stock prices and with its correlations. These
correlations can be used to derive a dependency network. Hence, we can derive a
network in which the links describe the relationships between the stocks equivalent
to correlations coefficients. One reason for why a network approach to this field is
interesting is that the classical portfolio models do at some point rely on the spectral
decomposition of some correlation matrix, and that for this to work efficiently we
need at least as many observations as we have stocks in your sample. As a logical
consequence a dimensional reduction is necessary if we want to have a look at many
stocks at the same time on shorter time horizons.
Our results do of course not allow us to manage any portfolio, but they do
allow us to quantify market behavior. We can identify if markets are stressed and
if this stress is local or global. This research is likely to be extended, covering
two important issues. First, this methodology needs to be put on firmer statistical
foundation, which means that measures for significance have to be derived. Secondly,
not only complete markets but also single stocks should be analyzed. This could
happen either jointly for all stocks of all markets, or in some hierarchic setting,
where first the relationships between functional groups of stocks are analyzed, and
single stocks follow at a second level. Such a setting could possibly also be extended
to work with different asset classes and more countries, such that the whole model
could work as a global financial seismograph.
The last chapter deals with a topic which has gained a lot of interest especially
since the last (still current?) financial crisis. The contagious effects that we have
seen during this crisis did not happen specifically on the interbank loan market, but
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rather trough asset backed securities and credit default swaps. Still, as a result the
interbank markets broke down, which was a sign of the loss of trust and showed the
awareness of the banks about immanent contagions effects.
The results from Chapter 5 show that the effect on interbank markets is a lasting
one. We observe a widening of spreads and most likely a changing behavior towards
large net exposures to counterparts. The very low market volume clearly indicates
that the central banks are still needed to keep the refinancing process running. The
way back to money markets that rely on the central bank only as a backup facility
seems rather long and bears opportunities for further research. The extension of the
bank network analysis to other markets and products is pressing but the availability
of data is still rather poor.
In general, the impact that this crisis had on policy seems a little bit disappoint-
ing, at least to the author. We have learned that this kind of financial contagion –
or cascade effects, as the physicist would say – can happen. The basic theoretical
foundations for its analysis have been laid, see, e.g., Watts (2002), and economists
have applied them to different markets. The response of the policy makers are
marginal changes to capital requirements of banks and the building up of massive
rescue facilities for the worst case. If we want to tackle these contagious risks more
seriously, there might be two approaches: Either we systematically account for this
risks as part of some new ‘Basel’ framework, or we need incentives that remind the
banks to distribute and share risk in our economy such that they no longer become
systemic.
To exonerate the policy makers a little bit it is fair to say that economists did
not prepare them very well for this crisis. As mentioned in the introduction, the
appearance of crisis is not very much favored in the setup of the mainstream macroe-
conomic models. There is some hope that the ongoing academic debriefing of this
crisis will have a ripple effect.
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APPENDIX
A. A HOLOGRAPHY OF THE GERMAN STOCK MARKET
A.1 Introduction and Data
This appendix investigates the system of the German stock market. We follow the
work by Kenett et al. (2009) who show that normalized correlation of returns show a
clearer picture of similarity than Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Similar like Kenett
et al. (2011) and Baruchi et al. (2006) we then perform a 3-dimensional mapping of
the correlations of stock returns of publicly listed German firms. Further we show
how to derive the plot of the correlations structures shown in the introduction of
this thesis.
The dataset consists of daily closing prices of all publicly listed German firms
for a period of two years (2008 and 2009). Thus, the firms in the dataset are largely
identical to the firms used in the analysis of board networks by Milakovic´ et al.
(2010). After removing firms with incomplete time series and negligible trading
volume, a total of 114 firms and 506 trading days remain.
A.2 Correlations
The stock prices are transformed to returns,
ri(t) = ln(Yi(t+ ∆t))− ln(Yi(t)). (A.1)
One can then calculate stock correlations using Pearsons’s correlation coefficient,
C(i, j) =
〈r(i)− µ(i)〉 〈r(j)− µ(j)〉
σ(i)σ(j)
. (A.2)
We also calculate a normalized correlation matrix. For this normalization we first
need the matrix of meta-correlations MC. The meta-correlation measures the sim-
ilarity of each two stocks i and j and is given by the respective two rows in the
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correlation matrix C, leaving out the elements C(i, i), C(j, j), C(i, j) and C(j, i).
MC(i, j) =
∑N
k 6=i,j(Cik − µci)(Cjk − µcj)√
〈Cˆ2i 〉〈Cˆ2j 〉
(A.3)
The normalized correlations NC can then by calculated by multiplying the elements
of the two matrices,
NCi,j = Ci,jMCi,j. (A.4)
Figures A.1 and A.2 show the raw and normalized correlations of stock return. The
stocks are ordered by similarity derived from applying a dendrogram algorithm. The
right part of each figure shows the level at which two elements are merged. Both
figures show some sectoral grouping (traditional industry on top and remaining
blue chips from about row 20). The normalized correlation show a more pronounced
grouping than the raw correlation, which is also visible from the less flat dendrogram
tree.
A.3 Holography
To visualize the network structure of stock returns we perform a dimensional re-
duction of the variable space by principal component analysis. Figure A.3 shows
all stock in a 3D space given by the leading eigenvectors. The information that
was lost by normalization and dimensional reduction is retrieved by plotting colored
links between most correlated stocks, the color of each line is determined by the
entries in the matrix of raw correlations C.
The Figure shows that the average correlation is increasing along the axis given
by the largest eigenvector. The most correlated stocks seem to form a convex hull
around stocks with less pronounced correlation. Figure A.4 shows that the decisive
subgroups which appear as red squares in Figure A.2 are the main attachment points
in 3D-space.
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Fig. A.4: Stocks in 3D principal space, top view
Color-codes lines, correlation > 0.5 (yellow), > 0.6 (magenta), > 0.7 (red).
B. THE HERDING MODEL
B.1 Independent One-Leader Benchmark
Let us start by considering an arbitrary agent in the fully connected core who is
always in a fixed state and does not change opinion. As before, let 1/N < p <
1 denote the fraction of followers that are connected to the fixed-opinion agent,
or independent leader, such that the agent has pF followers, and assume that the
remaining (1 − p)F followers are allocated with equal weight among the remaining
core agents, indexed by i = 1, . . . , N − 1. When p = 1/N , all core agents have
the same number of followers, F/N . Conversely when p → 1, the system is almost
entirely represented by the leader. For ease of notation, let us write the transition
probability as
pii = (a+ λNFi/F ) ∆t for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, (B.1)
where Fi now denotes the system-wide number of followers in the opposite state,
so the N − 1 equally weighted core agents will obey the transition rate (B.1). As
before, we set ∆t = 1/(a + λN). Furthermore, let β be an indicator function that
takes on the values 0 or 1 depending on whether the state of agent i equals or is
different from the state of the fixed-opinion agent. Then we can rewrite the herding
term in Eq. (B.1), NFi/F , taking into account the fixed opinion of the leader (say,
being optimistic)
N
Fi
F
=
N
F
(
Fpβ + (n− 1)F (1− p)
N − 1
)
, (B.2)
which yields the modified version of the transition probability (B.1),
pii =
(
a+ λNpβ + λ
N
N − 1(1− p)n
)
∆t (B.3)
≈ (a+ λNpβ + λ(1− p)n) ∆t
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for large N . Depending on the value of the indicator function β, the transition
probabilities of agent i are either
pii = (ε+ (1− p)n) λ∆t or (B.4)
pii = (ε+Np+ (1− p)n) λ∆t , (B.5)
where we adapted ε to the definition (2.7) by noting that a fully connected core
implies D = N .
Fixing the opinion of one agent is equivalent to creating an asymmetry in the
autonomous component that stems from the additional term Np in the modified
transition rates. Put simply, the system exhibits a tendency towards the fixed opin-
ion that depends on p. A straightforward mean-field argument (see, e.g., Alfarano
and Milakovic´, 2009) results in the following system-wide transition probabilities,
analogous to an extensive version of the transition rates (2.4) and (2.5),
pi− =
n
N
ε+ (1− p)(N − n)
ε+N
, (B.6)
pi+ =
(N − n)
N
ε+Np+ (1− p)n
ε+N
. (B.7)
The equilibrium distribution of such a unary Markov process is (see, e.g., Garibaldi
et al., 2003) the Polya distribution R(ε1, ε2; z), with z = n/N and shorthands
1
ε1 =
ε+Np
1− p , ε2 =
ε
1− p . (B.8)
Increasing the value of the control parameter p leads to an increasingly asymmetric
distribution peaked around the opinion of the leader. Fixing the opinion of one
agent, however, yields a very unsatisfactory approximation for the simulations in
Section 2.5, where the leader is not in a fixed state but rather switches states as well.
Therefore we proceed by assuming that the ‘independent’ leader switches opinion
randomly, without being influenced by other agents, which basically means that the
autonomous term in the mean-field transitions (B.6) and (B.7) is now stochastic and
time-dependent, hinging on the random realizations of the leader’s state.
Such a situation is harder to tackle analytically because it leads to a stochastic
differential equation with random coefficients. In order to approximate the full
mathematical problem, we employ a so-called adiabatic approximation that neglects
1 The Polya distribution converges to the Beta distribution for large N . The results of this
section, however, do not significantly depend on whether we use a continuous or discrete approach
(material upon request).
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the adjustment of the system to the switching of the leader by assuming that the
leader’s switches are slow enough in order for the N − 1 agents to reach statistical
equilibrium. Then we can consider the system as being in statistical equilibrium most
of the time and, consequently, the resulting equilibrium distribution Ge becomes the
superposition of two independent equilibrium distributions, corresponding to the
two possible configurations of the leader,
Ge =
1
2
R(ε1, ε2; z) +
1
2
R(ε2, ε1; z) , (B.9)
which is an average of the previous asymmetric distributions among the two alter-
native configurations of the leader. The equilibrium distribution is now symmetric
(note the interchange of the parameters ε1 and ε2) and U-shaped. From Eq. (B.9),
the second moment of the equilibrium distribution M2,e is given by
M2,e =
1
2
M2(ε1, ε2) +
1
2
M2(ε2, ε1) , (B.10)
where M2(·, ·) denotes the second moment of the respective asymmetric Polya dis-
tribution with parameters ε1, ε2, and the variance of the equilibrium distribution for
a given p is
V ar[z]p =
1
2
V ar[ε1, ε2] +
1
2
V ar[ε2, ε1]
+
1
2
{
M21 [ε1, ε2] +M
2
1 [ε2, ε1]
}− (1
2
)2
, (B.11)
where M1 designates the first moment of the respective asymmetric Polya distri-
bution, and 1/2 is obviously the mean of the equilibrium distribution Ge. The two
variances are equal since they are the same under an exchange of the two parameters
ε1, ε2, hence the previous equation can be written as
V ar[z]p = V ar[ε1, ε2] +
1
2
{
M21 [ε1, ε2] +M
2
1 [ε2, ε1]
}− 1
4
. (B.12)
It is possible to show (see, e.g., Garibaldi et al., 2003) that
M1[ε1, ε2] =
ε1
ε1 + ε2
, (B.13)
V ar[ε1, ε2] =
ε1ε2
(ε1 + ε2)2
ε1ε2 +N
N(ε1ε2 + 1)
, (B.14)
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and utilizing these in Eq. (B.12) yields
V ar[z] =
1
4
− ε1ε2
(ε1 + ε2)(ε1 + ε2 + 1)
. (B.15)
Finally, recalling the shorthands in (B.8), we obtain the variance as a function of
the control parameter p,
V ar[z]p =
1
4
− 1 + pN
(2 + pN)(3 + pN − p) , (B.16)
under the parameter choice ε = 1, i.e. λ = 1 and a = 1. For N  1, we immediately
see that Eq. (B.16) provides boundary values that are consistent with our previous
findings: if p = 1/N , the variance tends to 1/12, representing the correct value
for the uniform distribution (recall the parameter choice ε = 1); if p → 1, the
variance tends to 1/4, representing a distribution concentrated either in 0 or 1.
We simulated the modified model with a randomly switching leader, successively
increasing the control parameter p in a fully connected core of size N = 500 with a
total of F = 500, 000 followers. As before, we simulated each parametrization with
half a million sweeps.
The results, along with the prediction (B.16), are shown in Figure 2.3. For easier
comparison with the simulation results in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, we calculate the
standard deviation in the number of followers for each parametrization of p, which
is
σ =
√
1
N
(pF )2 +
N − 1
N
(
(1− p)F
N − 1
)2
−
(
F
N
)2
, (B.17)
and invert the relation to obtain
p =
σ
√
N − 1
F
+
1
N
. (B.18)
While the independent leader scenario exhibits a quicker convergence to the limit-
ing variance of one-fourth than the one-leader model, both versions are qualitatively
similar in the sense that there is sudden and pronounced increase in volatility already
for small values of p. The main difference between the independent vs one-leader
scenarios is that the independent leader switches randomly (thus independently) be-
tween the two states, while the switches of the one-leader in Section 2.5.3 still depend
on the interactions with the other core agents, which intuitively slows down the vari-
ance amplification relative to the independent leader case. As far as the creation of
fluctuations and therefore risk is concerned, the important common feature of both
models is that they exhibit a sudden and pronounced increase in system-wide volatil-
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ity as soon as a relatively small number of core agents obtains a disproportionately
large weight in the core network.
B.2 Source Code of the Herding Simulation
1 tend =19; % number o f l o o p s
2 T=500000; % T s t e p s
3 r e s u l t=zeros ( tend , 2 ) ;
4 N=500; %# of agents
5 r a t i o =1000;
6 draws=zeros (N, 1 ) ;
7 d e l t a=ones (N, 1 ) ;% herding s w i t c h e s
8 % i n i t i a l i z e random number genera tor
9 rand ( ’ t w i s t e r ’ ,sum(100∗ clock ) ) ;
10 randn( ’ s t a t e ’ ,sum(100∗ clock ) ) ;
11 %load t h e s ; % load f o l l o w e r s seed i f necessary
12 t ic ;
13 % o p t i o n a l parameter se tup
14 %p i n c r e a s e =−0.2;
15 %p s t a r t v a l u e =5.9;
16 %parameter=z e r o s ( tend , 1 ) ;
17 %parameter (1)=p s t a r t v a l u e ;
18 %f o r a=2: tend ;
19 % parameter ( a )=parameter (a−1)+p i n c r e a s e ;
20 %end
21
22 for l =1: tend %s t a r t MC loop
23 A=zeros (N,N) ;
24 count=zeros (T, 1 ) ;
25 WA=zeros (N,N) ;
26 CF=zeros (1 ,N) ; % # connected F
27 n l i n k s=zeros (1 ,N) ;
28 S=zeros (1 ,N) ; % # f o l l o w e r s
29
30 % s e t up random network ( o p t i o n a l )
31 %l i n k p r o b =1; % l i n k i n g ” p r o b a b i l i t y ”
32 %t h r e s h o l d=uni f rnd (0 ,1 ,N,N) ; %make matrix o f random numbers
33 %c=2;
34 %f o r a=1:N
35 % f o r b=c :N
36 % i f t h r e s h o l d (a , b )< l i n k p r o b
37 % A(a , b ) =1;
38 % A( b , a ) =1;
39 % end
40 % end
41 % c=c+1;
42 %end
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43
44 %A=c i r c l e (N, 2 5 ) ; % se tup l a t t i c e
45
46 A=s f g (N, 1 0 , 5 ) ; % setup s c a l e f r e e graph
47
48 %l i s t o f # of l i n k s
49 for a=1:N
50 n l i n k s (1 , a )=sum(A( a , : ) ) ;
51 end
52
53 % s e t aut . s w i t c h i n g f o r eps==1
54 aut=mean( n l i n k s ) /(N−1)
55 eps=aut∗N/mean( n l i n k s )
56
57 % homogenous agents s c e n a r i o
58 %S ( 1 , 1 :N) =1000;
59
60 % draw from uniform
61 %S ( 1 , 1 :N)=round ( abs ( uni f rnd ( r a t i o−parameter ( l ) , r a t i o+parameter (↘
l ) ,N, 1 ) ) ) ;
62
63 % draw f o l l o w e r s from pare to
64 %S ( 1 , : )=makemeanpareto ( parameter ( l ) , r a t i o ,N) ;
65
66 % t ake f o l l o w e r s seed
67 t seed ;
68 S ( 1 , : )=thes ( l , : ) ;
69 mixup ;
70
71 F=sum(S) ; % c a l c u l a t e t o t a l # o f f o l l o w e r s
72 avgF=F/N; % c a l c average f
73
74 for a=1:N % c a l c u l a t e connected f o l l o w e r s
75 xxf =0;
76 for b=1:N;
77 x f=A( a , b) ∗S(b) ;
78 xxf=xxf+xf ;
79 end
80 CF( a )=xxf ;
81 end
82
83 s i=round( un i f rnd (0 , 1 , 1 ,N) ) ;
84 for i =1:N
85 i f s i ( i )==0
86 s i ( i )=−1;
87 end
88 end
89 S=S .∗ s i ;
90
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91 for a=1:N % b u i l d we igh ted adj matrix
92 for b=1:N
93 WA( a , b)=A( a , b) ∗S(b) ;
94 end
95 end
96
97 for b=1:T % Swi tch ing . . .
98 draws ( : , 1 )=uni f rnd (0 , 1 ,N, 1 ) ;
99 for a=1:N
100 f i p l u s =0.5∗(CF( a )+sum(WA( a , : ) ) ) ;
101 f iminus=CF( a )− f i p l u s ;
102 i f S( a )<0
103 i f draws ( a )<(aut+d e l t a ( a ) ∗ f i p l u s /avgF ) /( aut+N) ;
104 S( a )=−S( a ) ;
105 WA( : , a )=−WA( : , a ) ;
106 end
107 else
108 i f draws ( a )<(aut+d e l t a ( a ) ∗ f iminus /avgF ) /( aut+N)
109 S( a )=−S( a ) ;
110 WA( : , a )=−WA( : , a ) ;
111 end
112 end
113 end
114 for a=1:N
115 i f S( a )>0
116 count (b)=count (b)+S( a ) +1;
117 end
118 end
119 end
120 share=count . / (F+N) ; % count ing share o f agents in each s t a t e
121 r e s u l t ( l , 2 )=var ( share ) ;
122 r e s u l t ( l , 1 )=std (abs (S) ) ;
123 toc ;
124 end % end MC loop
125 r e s u l t
126 save xs fg9 r e s u l t ;
C. FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT THE BOARD NETWORK
C.1 Source Code of the Clustering Algorithm
1 % f i n d groups in adj wi th pca
2 clear s t o r e s r ep r s r e p r a d j numb reprad j repr numeig a b lam myA↘
mynames s co r e a d j n l i s t optA corrmat e i g v a l e i gve c DDD ↘
s c o r e p o i n t s groupvalue groupid lam opt name stA ;
3 myA=Aoneb ; % read adj matrix
4 mynames=ycomp ( 1 : length (myA) ,1 ) ; % read corresponding v e c t o r o f↘
names
5 %b u i l d s t a n d a r d i z e d adj
6 myA=myA+diag ( ones ( length (myA) ,1 ) /2) ; % f i l l d iag
7
8 optA=zeros ( length (myA) ) ;
9 a d j n l i s t =(zeros ( length (myA) ,1 ) ) ;
10 %s t a n d a r d i z e adj matrix
11 for a=1: length (myA)
12 for b=1: length (myA)
13 stA (a , b)=(myA( a , b)−mean(myA( : , b ) ) ) /std (myA( : , b ) ) ;
14 end
15 end
16
17 % make corr matrix e i g e n v a l e s e t c .
18 corrmat=1/length (myA) ∗stA∗stA ’ ;
19 e i g v a l=eig ( corrmat ) ;
20 [ e igvec ,DDD] = eig ( corrmat ) ;
21 Factor=stA ’∗ e i gve c ;
22
23 a=1;
24 numeig=0;
25 while e i g v a l ( a , 1 ) > 3 .5
26 numeig=numeig+1;
27 a=a+1;
28 end
29
30 s co r e=zeros ( length (myA) ,2∗numeig ) ;
31
32 %make s c o r i n g m a t r i x p r o p o r t i a l to F
33 for a=1:numeig
34 s t o r e ( : , a+a−1)=Factor ( : , a ) /sum(abs ( Factor ( : , a ) ) ) ;
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35 s t o r e ( : , a+a )=−Factor ( : , a ) /sum(abs ( Factor ( : , a ) ) ) ;
36 end
37
38 i f sum( Factor ( : , 1 ) ) > 0
39 s c o r e p o i n t s ( : , 1 )=s t o r e ( : , 1 ) ;
40 s c o r e p o i n t s ( : , 2 : 2 ∗ numeig−1)=s t o r e ( : , 3 : 2 ∗ numeig ) ;
41 else
42 s c o r e p o i n t s ( : , 1 )=s t o r e ( : , 2 ) ;
43 s c o r e p o i n t s ( : , 2 : 2 ∗ numeig−1)=s t o r e ( : , 3 : 2 ∗ numeig ) ;
44 end
45
46 %s c o r i n g
47 for lam=1:2∗numeig−1
48 for b=1: length (myA)
49 for a=1: length (myA)
50 i f s c o r e p o i n t s ( a , lam )>0
51 i f myA( a , b)>0
52 s co r e (b , lam )=sco r e (b , lam )+s c o r e p o i n t s ( a , lam↘
) ˆ2 ;
53 else
54 s co r e (b , lam )=sco r e (b , lam )−0∗ s c o r e p o i n t s ( a ,↘
lam ) ˆ2 ;
55 end
56 end
57 i f s c o r e p o i n t s ( a , lam )<0
58 i f myA( a , b)==0
59 s co r e (b , lam )=sco r e (b , lam )+0∗ s c o r e p o i n t s ( a ,↘
lam ) ˆ2 ;
60 else
61 s co r e (b , lam )=sco r e (b , lam )−s c o r e p o i n t s ( a , lam↘
) ˆ2 ;
62 end
63 end
64 end
65 end
66 end
67
68 %s e l e c t b e s t f i t t e d group and w r i t e i n t o v e c t o r groupid
69 for a=1: length (myA)
70 [ gval , g id ]=max( s co r e ( a , : ) ) ;
71 i f max( s co r e ( a , : ) )>mean( s co r e ( : , g id ) )+std ( s co r e ( : , g id ) ) /2
72 [ groupvalue ( a ) , groupid ( a ) ]=max( s co r e ( a , : ) ) ;
73 else
74 groupvalue ( a )=−1;
75 groupid ( a )=2∗numeig ;
76 end
77 end
78
79 % remove f i rms wi th no good score
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80 numb=hist ( groupid , 1 : 1 : 2 ∗ numeig ) ;
81 for a=1: length (numb)
82 i f numb( a )<4
83 i f numb( a )>0
84 for b=1: length (myA)
85 i f groupid (b)==a
86 groupid (b)=2∗numeig ;
87 end
88 end
89 end
90 end
91 end
92
93 % make s o r t i n g l i s t from groupid
94 c =1;
95 for b=1:2∗numeig
96 for a=1: length (myA)
97 i f groupid ( a )==b
98 a d j n l i s t ( c )=a ;
99 c=c +1;
100 end
101 end
102 end
103
104 % r e s o r t adjacency matrix
105 for a=1: length (myA)
106 repr ( a , : )=s c o r e p o i n t s ( a d j n l i s t ( a ) , : ) ;
107 end
108
109 c =1;
110 for a=1: length (myA)
111 for b=c : length (myA)
112 i f myA( a d j n l i s t ( a ) , a d j n l i s t (b) )>0
113 optA ( a , b) =1;
114 optA (b , a ) =1;
115 opt name ( a , 1 )=mynames( a d j n l i s t ( a ) ) ;
116 end
117 end
118 c=c +1;
119 end
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C.2 Distribution of Board Membership
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1993 1528 136 36 17 11 8 3 2 3 0
1999 1528 113 34 16 9 5 3 1 0 2
2005 1436 107 31 9 7 2 1 0 0 0
Tab. C.1: Overall frequency distribution of mandates
year executives # of additional mandates
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1993 565 456 58 21 12 8 5 2 1 2 0
1999 539 469 29 19 9 5 4 1 1 0 2
2005 456 401 37 11 3 4 0 0 0 0 0
Tab. C.2: Frequency of executives’ supervisory board memberships
C.3 Transition Matrices for Board Membership
# of mandates in 1999
#
of
m
an
d
at
es
in
19
93
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 906 911 39 7 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 920 369 30 10 4 1 1 2 0 0 0
2 59 33 14 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 9 8 6 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
4 4 7 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
5 4 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
6 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 1
7 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tab. C.3: Transition matrix for board membership during 1993–1999.
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# of mandates in 2005
#
of
m
an
d
at
es
in
19
99
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 977 883 34 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 961 328 32 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 49 24 16 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
3 6 9 3 4 1 3 1 0 0 0 0
4 4 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
6 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tab. C.4: Transition matrix for board membership during 1999–2005
# of mandates in 2005
#
of
m
an
d
at
es
in
19
93
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 662 1125 58 16 4 2 0 0 0 0 0
1 1197 104 25 7 1 3 0 0 0 0 0
2 94 11 4 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
3 21 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 12 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
5 8 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
6 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tab. C.5: Transition matrix for board membership during 1993–2005
C. Further Details about the Board Network 126
C.4 Adjacency Matrices Sorted by Cliques
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
ALLIANZ
BAYER
DEGUSSA
DRESDNER B.
LINDE
LUFTHANSA
METALLGES.
RWE
SIEMENS
VEBA
COMMERZB.
HOCHTIEF
KARSTADT
MAN
THYSSEN
BAY. VEREINSB.
DEUTZ
DIDIER
G. GLAS
KLoeCKNER
PWA
SCHM.−LUBECA
SPAR
VIAG
BASF
CONTINENTAL
DTSCHE B.
HEIDELB. C.
KSB
RHEINEL.
SueDZUCKER
VOLKSW.
BABCOCK
BHF
BREM. VULKAN
DOUGLAS
FELTEN+G.
PREUSSAG
WAYSS+FR.
RHEINMET.
STRABAG
VEW
ALTANA
AMB
BRAU+BRUNNEN
IKB
AEG
BANKGES. BERLIN
DAIML.−BENZ
KAUFHOF
AGIV
ASKO
AVA
BARMAG
BAY. HYPO+W.BANK
BEIERSD.
BEWAG
BILF.+BERGER
BMW
BUDERUS
COLONIA
COMP. 2000
DBV WINT.
DEPFA
DLW
DueRR
ESCADA
FAG KUGELF.
FRESENIUS
GEA
GEHE
GROHE
HENKEL
HERLITZ
HOECHST
HORNBACH
HORTEN
IVG
IWKA
JUNGHEINRICH
KAMPA
KOLBENSCHM.
KRONES
KRUPP
LEIFHEIT
MANNESM.
MOKSEL
P. HOLZM.
PORSCHE
SALAMANDER
SAP
SCHERING
VARTA
VILL.+BOCH
VOLKSF.
WELLA
WERU
Fig. C.1: Resorted adjacency matrix 1993
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
ALLIANZ
BAYER
DRESDNER B.
DTSCHE B.
HOCHTIEF
LINDE
MANNESM.
MG
MueNCH. RueCK
SIEMENS
THYSSEN KRUPP
VEBA
VOLKSW.
BILF.+BERGER
BMW
DAIMLER−C.
DEGUSSA
HEIDELB. C.
HENKEL
LUFTHANSA
SCHWARZ PH.
TELEKOM
G. GLAS
K+S
KLoeCKNER
PHOENIX
SCHERING
SCHM.−LUBECA
VIAG
AMB
COMMERZB.
HUGO BOSS
MAN
FAG KUGELF.
HVB
SKW
BANKGES. BERLIN
CONTINENTAL
IVGSueDZUCKER
ADIDAS
AGIV
ALTANA
AVA
AXA COLONIA
BABCOCK B.
BASF
BEATE UHSE
BEIERSD.
BEWAG
BHW
BRAU+BRUNNEN
BUDERUS
DBV WINT.
DEPFA
DEUTZ
DOUGLAS
DYCKERHOFF
DueRR
ESCADA
FIELMANN
FRESENIUS
FRESENIUS MC
GEHEGOLD−ZACK
HANN. RueCK
HEIDELB. DRUCK
IKB
IWKA
JENOPTIK
JUNGHEINRICH
KAMPS
KARSTADT−Q.
KIEKERT
KOLBENSCHM.
KRONES
KSB
MERCK
METRO
MLP
P. HOLZM.
PORSCHE
PREUSSAG
PRO7
PUMA
RHEINMET.
RHoeN−KL.
RWE
SAP
SGL CARBONSIXT
SOFTWARE
SPARSTINNES
TARKETT S.
VARTA
VICTORIA
VOSSLOH
WCM
WELLA
Fig. C.2: Resorted adjacency matrix 1999
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
ALLIANZ
BAYER
COMMERZB.
DTSCHE B.
HOCHTIEF
LINDE
LUFTHANSA
MueNCH. RueCK
RWE
SIEMENS
THYSSEN KRUPP
TUI
VOLKSW.
HANN. RueCK
HEIDELB. DRUCK
PFLEIDERER
AAREAL B.
DEPFA
DTSCHE POST
DTSCHE TEL.
IKB
KARSTADT−Q.
POSTBANK
DTSCHE BoeRSE
SAP
SCHERING
DAIMLER−C.
DOUGLAS
LOEWE
BASF
BMW
HEIDELB. C.
INFINEON
MAN
ADIDAS
ALTANA
AMB GEN.
AWD
BEIERSD.
BERU
BILF.+BERGER
CELANESE
CELESIO
COMDIRECT
CONTINENTAL
DTSCHE EUROSH.
DYCKERHOFF
EADS
EON
ESCADA
FIELMANN
FRAPORT
FRESENIUS
FRESENIUS MC
GEA
GFK
GILDEMEISTER
HENKEL
HORNBACH
HUGO BOSS
HVB
HYPO REAL E.
INDUS
IVG
IWKA
JENOPTIK
JUNGHEINRICH
K+S
KLoeCKNER
KRONES
KoeNIG+B.
LANXESS
LEONI
MEDION
MERCK
METRO
MLP
MPC
MTU
NORDDTSCHE A.
PREMIERE
PRO7
PUMA
RHEINMET.
RHoeN−KL.
SALZG.
SCHWARZ PH.
SGL CARBON
SIXT
SOFTWARE
STADA
SueDZUCKER
TECHEM
TELEPLAN
THIEL−L.
VIVACON
VOSSLOH
WCM
WINCOR−NIXD.
ZAPF
Fig. C.3: Resorted adjacency matrix 2005
D. PLOTS OF THE FINANCIAL VILLAGE
D.1 Partial Correlations
Fig. D.1: Dynamics of the intra partial correlation
For each market, we use a 22-day window, and in each window calculate the intra partial
correlation, removing the effect of the index. Each horizontal line represents the average
correlation of one stock (the left ordinate displays the number of the stock).
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D.2 Pairwise Correlations between Countries
U.K.−Ger. U.S.−Ger. U.S.−U.K. Ger.−India U.K.−India Ger.−Japan U.S.−India U.S.−Japan
−0.5
0
0.5
1
U.K.−Japan Japan−IndiaU.K.−China Ger.−China U.S.−China India−ChinaJapan−China
−0.5
0
0.5
1
 
 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
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Fig. D.2: Average correlation of price indices
The year-by-year correlations were calculated as the average over all 66 day windows of
each year. The pairs are sorted in descending order by total average correlation. Averaging
by years allows us to judge on the general – medium to long run – interdependence between
markets.
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Fig. D.3: Average correlation of ICF
The year-by-year correlations were calculated as the average over all 66 day windows of
each year. The pairs are sorted in descending order by total average correlation. Averaging
by years allows us to judge on the general – medium to long run – interdependence between
markets.
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Fig. D.4: Average meta-correlation
The year-by-year correlations were calculated as the average over all 66 day windows of
each year. The pairs are sorted in descending order by total average correlation. Averaging
by years allows us to judge on the general – medium to long run – interdependence between
markets.
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Fig. D.5: Average index volatility correlation
The year-by-year correlations were calculated as the average over all 66 day windows of
each year. The pairs are sorted in descending order by total average correlation. Averaging
by years allows us to judge on the general – medium to long run – interdependence between
markets.
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D.3 Dynamics of ICF
Fig. D.6: Distributions of the Index Cohesive Force
ICF values for the Japaneses market in different periods - 2000-2003 (blue), 2004-2007
(orange), and 2008-2010 (red). It is observable that the distributions are different for the
studied periods, and that the ICF values are higher with a fat tail distribution for periods
marked by strong economic fluctuations.
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D.4 Meta-Correlations
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Fig. D.7: Market correlations: US-Germany, US-Japan
Index correlations (top) and meta-correlations (bottom) for US-Germany and US-Japan,
Lag with maximum correlation (blue cross) and correlation at lag 0 for the cross-correlation
of the indices. Both performed for a 66-day window.
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Fig. D.8: Market correlations: US-UK, US-India
Index correlations (top) and meta-correlations (bottom) for US-UK and US-India, Lag
with maximum correlation (blue cross) and correlation at lag 0 for the cross-correlation of
the indices. Both performed for a 66-day window.
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Fig. D.9: Market correlations: US-China, UK-Germany
Index correlations (top) and meta-correlations (bottom) for US-China and UK-Germany,
Lag with maximum correlation (blue cross) and correlation at lag 0 for the cross-correlation
of the indices. Both performed for a 66-day window.
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Fig. D.10: Market correlations: UK-Japan, UK-India
Index correlations (top) and meta-correlations (bottom) for UK-Japan and UK-India, Lag
with maximum correlation (blue cross) and correlation at lag 0 for the cross-correlation of
the indices. Both performed for a 66-day window.
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Fig. D.11: Market correlations: UK-China, Germany-Japan
Index correlations (top) and meta-correlations (bottom) for UK-China and Germany-
Japan, Lag with maximum correlation (blue cross) and correlation at lag 0 for the cross-
correlation of the indices. Both performed for a 66-day window.
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Fig. D.12: Market correlations: Germany-India, Germany-China
Index correlations (top) and meta-correlations (bottom) for Germany-India and Germany-
China, Lag with maximum correlation (blue cross) and correlation at lag 0 for the cross-
correlation of the indices. Both performed for a 66-day window.
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Fig. D.13: Market correlations: Japan-India, Japan-China
Index correlations (top) and meta-correlations (bottom) for Japan-India and Japan-China,
Lag with maximum correlation (blue cross) and correlation at lag 0 for the cross-correlation
of the indices. Both performed for a 66-day window.
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Fig. D.14: Market correlations: India-China
Index correlations (top) and meta-correlations (bottom) for India-China, Lag with max-
imum correlation (blue cross) and correlation at lag 0 for the cross-correlation of the
indices. Both performed for a 66-day window.
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D.5 Alternative Crosscorrelation Plots
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Fig. D.15: Cross-correlation plot of meta-correlations
Cross-correlation plot of meta-correlations. Black marker on maximum if the correlation
is higher than .7, U.S. against all other markets. Performed for a 66-day window.
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Fig. D.16: Cross-correlation plot of index correlations
Black marker on maximum if the correlation is higher than .7, U.S. against all other
markets. Performed for a 66 day window.
E. ADDITIONAL PLOTS ON THE INTERBANK LOAN
MARKET
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Fig. E.1: Comparing γ and η for the two models
The coefficients of the bank fixed effects in the left scatter plot (n = 176) are mostly close
to a 45-degree line. The comparison of the preferential lending fixed effects n = 412 looks
a little bit more noisy, still only about 5% of the observations are far from the
45-degree line.
E. Additional Plots on the Interbank Loan Market 142
DE0009
IT0071
IT0145
IT0053
IT0079
IT0114
IT0179
IT0216
IT0094
IT0215
IT0141
IT0229
IT0031
IT0123
IT0138
IT0076
IT0143
IT0107
IT0042
IT0272
IT0088
IT0227
IT0104
IT0020
IT0161
IT0139
IT0202
IT0004
IT0210IT0111
IT0231
IT0205
IT0041
IT0183
IT0226
IT0236IT0245
IT0099
IT0195
IT0023
IT0211
IT0209
IT0221
IT0090
IT0005
IT0189
IT0109
IT0174
IT0267
IT0237
IT0170
IT0159
IT0222
IT0217
IT0002
IT0160
IT0165
IT0175
Pajek
Fig. E.2: Network of non-preferential lending, 1999–2006
The “network of enemies” has a very special structure. Instead of a connected core we
observe an almost circle like network with hubs that connect to the periphery but have
relatively little links to other core hubs.
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Fig. E.3: Spreads year by year
The histograms for the year by year estimated γ show similar distributions for 1999–2007
(exception: 2001). In 2008 amd 2010 the range of spreads is much wider. 2009 shows an
increase of the mean value but also a much narrower distribution.
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Fig. E.4: Network of non-preferential lending, post-Lehman
The network of non-preferential lending for the post Lehman period has similar character-
istics like the network of preferential lending until 2006.
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